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DISCRIMINATORY TAINT
W. Kerrel Murray*
The truism that history matters can hide complexities. Consider the idea of problematic
policy lineages. When may we call a policy the progeny of an earlier, discriminatory
policy, especially if the policies diverge in design and designer? Does such a
relationship condemn the later policy for all times and purposes, or can a later
decisionmaker escape the past? It is an old problem, but its resolution hardly seems
impending. Just recently, Supreme Court cases have confronted this fact pattern across
subject matters as diverse as entry restrictions, nonunanimous juries, and redistricting,
among others. Majority opinions seem unsure whether or why “discriminatory
predecessors” matter, and individual Justices who agree that they do squabble over
methodology.
One could answer these questions by banishing them. Thus, some would simply treat
any nonidentical policy predecessor as minimally relevant, and only relevant insofar as
it suggests present-day bad intent. Anything else, they suggest, risks an unmoored
original sin jurisprudence, with courts claiming to know guilt when they see it. Simple
is not always better, however, especially if it risks eliding information material to a
policy’s validity. But again: how do we divine materiality?
Better approaches are possible. While our law broadly appreciates that continuity
matters to legal meaning and responsibility, constitutional law has undertheorized it.
Deploying continuity here helps conceptualize, and craft guideposts for, “discriminatory
taint”: an objectively ascertainable relationship between an earlier policy and a later,
similar policy. Thus defined, taint can impugn some policies that might otherwise have
passed constitutional muster. Yet it also facilitates realistic approaches — judicial and
nonjudicial — to distinguishing genuine purging of taint from its laundering. And it
supplements debates on the nature of wrongful discrimination by underscoring how
continuity can help identify persistent constitutional problems even absent subjective
bad intent.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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University of North Carolina School of Law, the 2021 John Mercer Langston Workshop at
Berkeley Law, the 2021 Minnesota Law School Public Law Workshop, the 2021 Culp Colloquium
at Duke Law, and the 2022 National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars at the University
of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law’s Rehnquist Center. Special thanks to Jessica
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INTRODUCTION

I

f the federal government implements a facially neutral, countrytargeted travel ban, does it matter that it closely follows, and invokes the same justifications, as two similar bans, both enjoined on
Establishment Clause grounds?1 What if Louisiana invokes neutral
reasons for reaffirming a law permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts,
seventy-six years after adopting it for racist reasons?2 Or if Texas’s
redistricting maps draw partly on older maps that a court concluded
were unconstitutional?3 Or if a city closes pools, ostensibly for safety
and cost reasons, but only after a court enjoined their segregated
operation?4 Assuming it does matter, how much, and for how long?5
Judging from the majority and separate opinions in these (and
other6) cases, the Supreme Court’s answer resembles a shrug. Of
course, as conventional antidiscrimination doctrine recognizes, the past
can matter.7 Throughout the federal judiciary, however, that general
recognition has not generated consistency in cases posing what we
might call the “discriminatory predecessor” problem, i.e., where an
older policy can credibly be called the progenitor of a contemporary
policy actually under review.8
These diverse recurrences reveal practical importance. The varied
approaches9 reveal theoretical importance. Despite deploying the
mens rea–inflected language of “intent,”10 courts in constitutional
antidiscrimination cases necessarily infer wrongful discrimination from
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 See, e.g., Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and Constitutional Rights,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 2147, 2173–75, 2177 n.164 (2019) (discussing litigation leading up to Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)).
2 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394, 1401 n.44 (2020); id. at 1426 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
3 See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313, 2316–18, 2325–26 (2018).
4 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971).
5 See, e.g., id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (raising fear that impeaching contemporary
facially neutral action with past actions could unjustly “lock[] in” that policy choice indefinitely,
notwithstanding later-manifesting legitimate reasons).
6 See infra section I.C, pp. 1203–11 (discussing, inter alia, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); and Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019)).
7 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
(directing equal protection attention to “[t]he historical background of the decision” and “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision”); see also McCreary County v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (same principle for the Establishment Clause); Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (citing Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266) (same for the Free Exercise Clause).
8 See infra section I.C, pp. 1203–11. This is distinct from whether a past violation’s lingering
effects preclude the termination of continuing injunctive relief connected to that violation. See
Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1163–64, 1164 n.61
(2000) (discussing vestiges).
9 See infra section I.C, pp. 1203–11.
10 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1214–
24 (2018).
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the circumstances. We seem to intuit that discriminatory predecessors
might be unusually relevant — but past that intuition, we splinter.
The theoretical muddle may stem from the tricky questions relating
to just how powerful evidence of discriminatory predecessors should
be. If the key is the permissibility of contemporary action at Time 2
(T2), surely some earlier (Time 1/T1) action “cannot, in the manner of
original sin, condemn government action that is not itself unlawful.”11
Or take the very idea of a “predecessor.” Naturally, “the world is not
made brand new every morning,”12 and some past events connect
causally to some present events. But, formally, new policies are just
that: new. As such, they may have new facially legitimate justifications, or deviate in form from their ostensible predecessors. Indeed, at
least sometimes defendants might challenge the predecessors’ wrongfulness and insist that this contestability renders their character
uninformative to the present substantive question.13 Safer, perhaps, to
say only that history broadly matters as context that might aid an
all-things-considered analysis of T2 policies, which must stand and fall
on their own merits.14
Greater illumination is possible. Start with pretext. Those who
disagree on the frequency of wrongful discrimination should nevertheless agree that wrongdoers should not be able to continue acting with
unreconstructed unconstitutional aims. But policy change over time
can cloak precisely that behavior, especially when we often must infer
a policy’s illegitimacy from a context that bad faith actors can
manipulate. We can thus gain much from better understanding
temporal pretext. This Article accordingly describes a type of relationship distinguished by the formal and functional continuity of temporally separated policies. At minimum, this contribution richens our account of how change over time affects pretext-based claims.15
But taking constitutional continuity seriously can tell us more.
Once comprehendible, these relationships do more than just suggest
pretext. The persistence of an older policy’s operative core can manifest a “discriminatory taint” that alone should impugn an otherwise fa–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (emphasis added) (quoting City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
12 McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866.
13 See infra section V.A.2, pp. 1261–64.
14 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 (1982); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past
Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 829 (1983).
15 Thus, the “genetic fallacy” — the “alleged mistake of arguing that something is to be
rejected because of its suspicious origins” — is inapposite here. Genetic Fallacy, THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF PHIL. (Simon Blackburn ed., 2d rev. ed. 2008) (emphasis added),
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199541430.001.0001/acref9780199541430-e-1360 [https://perma.cc/2297-CPR4]. After all, “[f]requently such reasoning is,
actually, quite appropriate,” id., and often especially in the legal sphere, see Charles L. Barzun,
The Genetic Fallacy and a Living Constitution, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 429, 433 (2019).
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cially legitimate policy. Understanding what taint is and how to find it
advances antidiscrimination discourse in multiple areas. It can help
courts navigate what taint means for adjudication (for example,
whether and when they should deem taint purged and how to proceed
when it is not), guide nonjudicial decisionmaking (for example, choosing how to act and justifying said choices), and inform scholarly
understanding of wrongful discrimination (both over time and as a
generalizable phenomenon).
In pursuit of the foregoing, this Article makes three contributions.
First, this Article opened with diverse examples to emphasize the
wide-ranging need for careful thought about the relevance of time and
change in this context. To be sure, the broad idea that problematic
history could affect present-day analysis is not new.16 Nor are more
specific considerations of a discrete past policy’s possible relevance to
an arguable descendant’s constitutional meaning.17 In the October
2019 Term alone, dueling opinions in a redistricting case invoked
“taint” explicitly,18 and multiple other cases grappled with the concept
under other names.19 Commentators, too, have noted the potential
thorny issues the T1/T2 pattern can raise, but almost invariably in
passing.20
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 424 (1960) (describing segregation’s “apostolic succession from slavery”); Elise C. Boddie,
Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1285 (2016); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 144–45 (1976) (discussing the possibility of
heightened scrutiny for facially neutral state action that perpetuates the effects of past wrongful
discrimination); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J.
1311, 1313–14 (2002); Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and
the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2062, 2086 (2021); Schnapper, supra note 14,
at 829–31 (discussing a variety of types of “perpetuation of racial discrimination,” id. at 829); Reva
B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2178–80 (1996) (discussing “continuity” between legal regimes that “enforce[] social stratification,”
id. at 2178); David A. Super, Temporal Equal Protection, 98 N.C. L. REV. 59, 61–64 (2019).
17 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 560–71 (2018)
(discussing taint as a remedial complication of recognizing explicit bias); Justin Driver,
Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 943 (2014) (describing “backup[s],” “replacement
state [policies] designed to preserve as much as possible of a legal model that either has recently
been invalidated or seems certain to be invalidated in the near future”).
18 Compare Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–25 (2018), with id. at 2346–47, 2352
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
19 See generally Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020). Compare Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t
of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2267–74 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring), with id. at 2293 n.2
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 141 & n.26 (1980); Micah
Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the Travel Ban, in
NOMOS LXI: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 201, 219–23 (Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg eds.,
2019); Gabriel J. Chin, Rehabilitating Unconstitutional Statutes: An Analysis of Cotton v.
Fordice, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 421 (2002); Clarke, supra note 17, at 560–71; Kim Forde-Mazrui, The
Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2389–95
(2000) (raising the specter of readoption of “suspect policies for nonsuspect reasons,” id. at 2389);
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This Article probes deeper. The passing commentary has spent
little time on details like whether taint requires perfect identity, and, if
not, how to determine which differences preclude it. Courts forced to
address the issue without reliable theoretical frameworks have done so
in inconsistent and undeveloped ways.21 This Article aims to flesh out
the taint concept as a detectable type of relationship between an earlier
policy and a later policy. I accordingly offer a framework that looks
first to the earlier policy’s operation and next to markers of material
continuity in the subsequent policy. In so doing, I draw on and build
upon diverse areas in which continuity over time shapes assignments
of legal responsibility, including mootness law and criminal law,22 constructing my proposal for constitutional responsibility as a species of
institutional temporal realism.23 A tainted relationship embodies a historical fact that is uniquely relevant to any T2 inquiry — so relevant,
in fact, that it justifies treating the T2 policy with increased
skepticism.
Delineating taint’s contours generates the Article’s second contribution. Taint can aid searches for present-day bad intent, but its
implications for longstanding debates over how we detect wrongful
discrimination24 go further. The Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination
doctrine is widely understood as requiring specific, subjective intent to

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1473–
74 (2018) (noting possible relevance of taint to policy reenactment); Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an
Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1045 n.82 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s
Pro-partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 67 & n.95 (2020); Leslie Kendrick & Micah
Schwartzman, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term — Comment: The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 133, 149–50 (2018) (briefly discussing “[f]utility and [t]aint,” id. at 149); Richard C.
Schragger, Of Crosses and Confederate Monuments: A Theory of Unconstitutional Government
Speech, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 49 n.21, 64 (2021); Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State
Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 147, 149 (2000) (noting the possibility of “taint of original invidious intent” but finding it unclear whether and how it might be “purge[d]” from a policy reenactment, id. at 149); see also sources cited supra note 17. Professor Gabriel Chin’s project is closest
to mine, but he deals with a single case where the temporal relationship could not seriously be
disputed, which obviated the need to delve into harder cases of relation. See Chin, supra, at 423.
Our proposed solutions also diverge. A forthcoming project from Rebecca Aviel will also grapple
with many of the questions of intertemporal discrimination this Article raises.
See
Rebecca Aviel, Second-Bite Lawmaking, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
21 See infra section I.C, pp. 1203–11.
22 See infra Part II, pp. 1212–27.
23 See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and
Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2.
24 See, e.g., BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 1–7, 74 (2015);
DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 525–34 (2016);
Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 203–20.
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harm because of a protected trait.25 Whatever might be said about
that approach generally, taint accentuates its weaknesses.
As
described in this Article, taint can coexist with genuinely pure-hearted
T2 decisionmakers.26 The same facts that concretize the taint concept,
however, also indicate that more matters than pure-heartedness when
evaluating a tainted T2. That is, properly understood, taint describes
a scenario where a decision rule focused on specific intent is uniquely
inapt. In making this point, the Article offers a novel, targeted
critique of antidiscrimination decision rules focused on decisionmaker
“intent” and engages recent literature on the necessary prerequisites to
wrongful discrimination.27
Finally, the Article addresses implementation. Taint is a fact about
a T2 policy that triggers a taint-sensitive way of evaluating validity,
not an independently sufficient demonstration of invalidity. That
understanding of taint as a trigger facilitates a nuanced approach that
both prevents the perpetuation of wrongful discrimination and enables
taint’s genuine purging, rather than its laundering. I argue that this
can aid both judicial and nonjudicial actors.
Courts that find taint should focus on whether the state can re-earn
whatever clean-slate treatment the T2 policy would otherwise have
received. Key here is a targeted disinterring of constitutional disparate
On this
impact, notwithstanding usual judicial skepticism.28
two-pronged approach, courts first ask whether the state can show
that the contemporary policy has eliminated any meaningful disparate
impact. Second — if the state cannot so show — it must make a
heightened showing of why it cannot eliminate the disparate impact
and why the legitimate need for this means of pursuing a nondiscriminatory government interest outweighs the harm of shielding
the disparate impact of a tainted rule. Although I offer a unique
approach to that heightened showing, I draw on analogies to other ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25 See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1097 (7th ed. 2018); Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term —
Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 43 (2018); Ian Haney-López, Intentional
Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1833, 1837–38 (2012); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318, 324
(1987); Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical Evidence of
Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp — And Some Pathways for Change, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 1269, 1279 (2018). But see, e.g., WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS 91 & n.2 (2017) (contesting this doctrinal view and noting academic disagreement); infra section III.D, pp. 1234–35.
26 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 934–36, 945–
47 (2016); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 960–61 (1989).
27 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 10, at 1218, 1223–24; sources cited supra note 24.
28 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–48 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 25, at
318–21.
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amples of heightened scrutiny to show that courts are well equipped to
conduct such analyses.
Moreover, taint offers utility beyond adjudication. Many limits on
judicial action (for example, institutional role, judicial procedure, and
the countermajoritarian difficulty)29 do not constrain nonjudicial
actors.30 Moreover, nonjudicial status does not terminate an actor’s
duty to consider independently how constitutional norms ought to
shape its self-conception, obligations to its polity, and actions. For
those actors, this Article’s framework can be a tool of democratic empowerment. For example, in some cases where a court might not find
taint judicially actionable, political actors can deploy it — if they
choose — to locate taint and justify ostensibly purgative policy.
Two prefatory limitations warrant mention. To facilitate depth
over breadth, I treat taint as a constitutional concept and do not
attempt full-bore engagement with the vagaries of statutory
antidiscrimination law. Furthermore, I elaborate the concept in the
“status-based discrimination” context, that is, discrimination relating to
“the cultural markers . . . that distinguish groups.”31 Accordingly, my
paradigm cases embrace the equal-treatment problems familiar to the
Equal Protection Clause and constitutional contexts with some
convergent doctrinal evolution, such as the Religion Clauses.32 With
the concept in hand, I plan in a future work to offer a more comprehensive taxonomy of the different settings in which taint might
manifest and explore whether those different settings require treating
taint differently.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I starts by elaborating the
problem from earlier core manifestations through to contemporary,
murkier examples. Part II steps back to consider the relevance of intertemporal continuity to legal responsibility and how such continuity
can shape a functional, rigorous, and transsubstantive concept of discriminatory taint. Part III types the descriptive phenomenon as a
constitutional concept that ought to trigger a taint-specific antidiscrimination decision rule that, importantly, rejects the centrality of
specific intent. Part IV offers prescriptions for various actors in implementing the concept, and Part V concludes by engaging the most
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16, 25–26 (1962); see
also Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term — Comment: Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 186–90 (1997) (emphasizing the relevance of institutional differences to permissible government action).
30 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1807–08 (2010)
(considering these role differences vis-à-vis congressional enforcement power under the
Reconstruction Amendments).
31 J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2325 (1997).
32 See id. at 2346–49; see also infra section V.B.3, pp. 1267–68.
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pressing critiques and noting potential implications of the analysis for
other legal questions.
I. AN UNAPPRECIATED PROBLEM
The current problem does not stem from disagreement about history’s relevance, understood abstractly. Most everyone agrees that
context matters, and that history is context. As it turns out, however,
courts are distinctively at sea when it comes to the detection and
import of discriminatory policy predecessors.
A. Roots
A modern framework can benefit from examining the approach to
continuity and change over time reflected in older, polar cases. Two
excellent examples are the Grandfather Clause cases and the White
Primary Cases.
The former set began with Guinn v. United States,33 which involved an Oklahoma constitutional amendment that imposed a
literacy requirement for voting, but then exempted any person who
was either entitled to vote on January 1, 1866, or descended from such
a person.34 This facially race-neutral provision’s aim was clear. No
one could imagine any basis for pegging the exemption to 1866 other
than an attempt to perpetuate sub silentio what the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibited, and the Court invalidated it as such.35
Undeterred, Oklahoma immediately enacted a new scheme.36 It
automatically qualified anyone who voted in 1914 (under the suffrage
provision Guinn invalidated), but barred everyone else from registering unless they applied during two weeks at the start of May 1916.37
But the changed form couldn’t insulate the new provision: “The
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination. . . . [The new scheme] partakes too much of the
infirmity of [the old].”38 The two-week new-registration period

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33
34

238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Id. at 357. Oklahoma, notably, secured its 1907 admission to the Union with a suffrage
provision that would pass muster today (but for its reservation of the franchise to male citizens).
See id. at 355, 357. “Shortly after” admission, it effected this “radical change” in the provision.
Id. at 355.
35 See id. at 364–65, 367. Because the Fifteenth Amendment passed in 1870, Oklahoma’s provision was in a sense overinclusive by four years, but that hardly disguised its discriminatory
descent.
36 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 53 (5th ed. 2016).
37 See id.
38 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
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“operated unfairly against the very class” for whom the Amendment
was passed.39
Similarly, Texas worked overtime in the White Primary Cases40 to
repackage an invalid policy as constitutional. Post-Reconstruction,
Texas was a one-party Democratic state.41 Over roughly thirty years,
Texas Democrats deployed: statutory bars on any Black person’s
participation in Democratic primaries (Nixon I42); express statutory direction to state party executive committees to determine their
members, with predictable results (Nixon II43); an ostensibly
independent party resolution barring Black participation (Grovey44
and Smith45); and (in at least one county) an ostensibly private, voluntary “club” with de facto control over nominations that limited its
membership to White persons (Terry46).47 That the policies discriminated was always obvious. After Nixon I, the impediment was the
absence of obvious state action.48 Yet, in asking whether state action
indeed produced the discrimination, the Court surely was not ignorant
of what a four-Justice concurrence in Terry called “[a]n old pattern in
new guise.”49
These are some of the clearest premodern50 cases of discriminatory
descent. Also relevant are cases of clear attempts to evade a
previously stated universal rule, even if not announced in the first instance against the evader. These include cases growing out of Massive
Resistance to Brown v. Board of Education,51 or cases dealing with
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 Id. at 277; see also Driver, supra note 17, at 945–46 (classifying the new provision as a
“backup”).
40 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)); Grovey, 295 U.S. 45; Nixon v. Condon (Nixon II), 286
U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon (Nixon I), 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
41 ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 266.
42 273 U.S. 536.
43 286 U.S. 73.
44 295 U.S. 45.
45 321 U.S. 649.
46 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
47 See id. at 266–79.
48 See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 203 (2008); Smith, 321 U.S. at
661–62.
49 345 U.S. at 480 & n.7 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Nixon I, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon II, 286
U.S. 73; and then Smith, 321 U.S. 649).
50 By premodern I mean before the late 1970s, when equal protection doctrine settled on a
focus on government “intent.” See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1850–51 (2008); Strauss, supra note 26, at 951–52.
51 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 25, at 1040; JUSTIN DRIVER, THE
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE 263 (2018) (discussing Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)); Alan
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1090 (1978) (citing Monroe v. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968)); Strauss, supra note 26, at 949 n.46 (citing Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964)).
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clever denials of the right to jury service,52 and the “unremitting and
ingenious” voting discrimination that Congress found to justify the
Voting Rights Act’s (VRA) preclearance provision.53 It breaks no new
ground to observe that “those . . . who are of a mind to discriminate”54
may treat a formal legal proscription on discrimination as a prompt to
discriminate more efficiently rather than to cease. More important are
the relationships these examples demonstrate. Terry taken alone might
be one thing; Terry as the culmination of multifarious attempts to exclude Black Texans from exercising political power is another.
B. The Problem’s Persistence
Notwithstanding these older cases, one might wonder whether any
conceptual problem remains. Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court’s
equal protection cases have instructed55 courts to ask whether an ostensibly neutral action was actually motivated at least in part by
discriminatory purpose.56 The analysis is contextual and includes attention to the “historical background of the [challenged] decision” as a
legitimate “evidentiary source.”57 Free exercise analysis of intentional
religious discrimination has incorporated that approach.58 The deceptively simple conclusion is that discriminatory descent simply folds into the holistic enterprise as part of historical background. But that
would leave at least two problems unanswered: how to determine discriminatory descent and what exactly folding it in entails. To sharpen
the point, consider McCleskey v. Kemp.59
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 n.25 (1986) (overruling Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965)); Swain, 380 U.S. at 221–26 (declining to hold that an individual peremptory
strike of a Black juror could be unconstitutional unless part of a striking and systematic pattern
of racially disparate strikes); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 407 (1945) (failing to invalidate a conviction obtained under a facially neutral scheme executed so as to permit just one, but no more,
Black person per grand jury); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942) (invalidating a conviction
obtained under a facially neutral scheme that worked to eliminate any Black person’s participation on juries); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598–99 (1935) (same); Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213, 221, 225 (1898) (failing to invalidate a facially neutral state scheme intended to bar
Black persons from jury service); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1880) (invalidating
a West Virginia statute explicitly banning Black persons from jury service).
53 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966); see also id. at 309–15.
54 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
55 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
56 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–68; see also Bertrall L. Ross
II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 178 (2012).
57 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
58 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–41 (1993);
see also Huq, supra note 10, at 1238.
59 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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McCleskey is perhaps best known for its skepticism of statistical
analysis.60 But McCleskey also offered what the majority called “historical evidence” of “Georgia laws in force during and just after the
Civil War.”61 That sterile phrasing understated those laws, which
made execution race-dependent; McCleskey argued that Georgia’s
contemporary capital laws operated as their de facto descendants.62
The Court dismissed the argument in a curt footnote: While a decision’s “historical background . . . is one evidentiary source” of proof,63
“unless historical evidence is reasonably contemporaneous with the
challenged decision, it has little probative value.”64 Thus, “official actions taken long ago” are unacceptable “as evidence of current
intent.”65
This begins to bring the problem into focus. Any contemporary
government policy exists subsequent to many other policies. The interesting, and difficult, puzzle for this Article is whether a policy might
relate to a predecessor such that the fact of that relationship directs a
different evaluative outcome. The problem suggests a spectrum; how
do we know how related is related enough?66 And how should we
treat a related policy, once identified?
For constitutional law purposes, it would not do to take
McCleskey’s footnote to mean that we just ignore any policy that is not
“reasonably contemporaneous” (whatever that means). The footnote is
undertheorized, even beyond the vagueness of “reasonably.” Understanding it as denying the relevance of any history beyond a modern
policy’s immediately contemporaneous history (for example, legislative
history67) would be inconsistent with the approaches seen in section
I.A, Arlington Heights’s attention to “historical background,” and (as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
60 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 1637, 1678 & n.184 (2018).
61 481 U.S. at 298 n.20.
62 See id. at 329–30 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing Georgia’s “dual system” of capital
punishment, id. at 329); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and
the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1411–13, 1424 (1988) (elaborating upon that dual
system and its “continuity,” id. at 1412, with the capital system challenged in McCleskey).
63 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 n.20 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)).
64 Id. Notably, the Court cited Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), which invalidated
a 1901 Alabama constitutional provision that disenfranchised anyone convicted of a crime involving “moral turpitude.” Id. at 223. The Court treated Underwood as easy, given the 1901 constitutional convention’s avowedly White supremacist aims and the provision’s present-day disparate
impact. Id. at 227, 229. McCleskey could be read to imply, therefore, that this was the sort of
historical background that interested the Court, not background based on lines of descent.
65 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 n.20.
66 Cf. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1373 n.210 (“[E]verything is related to everything else under . . . some time frame. The meaningful question[ is] . . . which time frame.”).
67 See, e.g., supra note 64.
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we will see) how continuity is treated elsewhere in law.68 The Court
has not yet held that the only history that matters is the history the
government endorses.
Observing that McCleskey’s inchoate skepticism does not a theory
make is not itself a theory. But it does emphasize the persistence of a
problem. Failing to think carefully about why and how past related
policies matter risks cursory, inconsistent analyses of wrongful discrimination. The next section observes this risk’s modern manifestation.
C. The Problem in Practice
Before proceeding, a note on what I bracket. We might be interested in how noncontemporaneous history at a high level of
abstraction should shape analysis of discrete contemporary action.
Perhaps, for example, a jurisdiction’s history of discrimination should
always inform the evaluation of its contemporary behavior. That argument would confront judicial hostility to supposedly “amorphous”
concepts of “societal discrimination,” a likely target of the McCleskey
footnote just discussed.69 Although that hostility can be critiqued, that
is not this Article’s goal.
Nor am I examining propositions of the form “because this type of
regulation was used, or could have been used, for suspect ends in the
past (somewhere), all contemporary such regulation is suspect today.”70
Defending that claim would require more — and different — emphasis
on how one demonstrates a past-present nexus and connects
particularized present harms to a more nebulous past.71 Taint might
well matter in understanding how a general recognition of a
discrimination-riddled past might generate or explain a variety of
present-day disparate outcomes. I just believe that such a use is more
expansive in a way that would require further theorization.
I focus instead on a narrower, yet still important question.
Sometimes, a government act isn’t just earlier in time than another
act, but seems related to the later act in a generative way. The chal–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68
69

See infra section II.A, pp. 1212–15.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); see
also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2016) (discounting, in a voter ID case, the
relevance of Texas’s general history of voting discrimination (citing McCleskey)); Hayden v.
Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2010).
70 Cf. Darrell A.H. Miller, Tainted Precedent, 74 ARK. L. REV. 291, 295 (2021) (critiquing such
arguments); Murray, supra note 16, at 2086 (critiquing anti-abortion argument premised on connecting American history of eugenics with the potential for abortion’s use in eugenicist ways).
71 For similar reasons, I mostly bracket interrogation of private discrimination qua private
discrimination, although past private discrimination that generates discrete past public discrimination could be relevant to a taint-based analysis of a successor public act. Cf. Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435, 436–39 (1970) (considering, after judicial invalidation of a public park’s segregated
operation under the trust that willed the city the park property, whether a state court could constitutionally terminate the trust and revert the property to decedent’s heirs).
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lenge is concretizing that intuition. The nexus problem remains (Part
II seeks to solve it) but in less amorphous form than more freewheeling
inquiries into the past’s relevance to the present.
We can learn much from this narrower focus. As this section will
show, substantial judicial disagreement exists on whether we should
even care about a supposedly problematic genealogy, on how to identify it if it is a legitimate quarry, or on how its presence ought to affect
the validity of the action being reviewed. The first task is grasping the
disagreement.
To do so, I have selected a fairly illustrative set of cases presenting
the T1/T2 pattern, and attempted a rough categorization. Though the
cases sometimes defy easy placement in boxes, the approaches to the
problem of policy continuity fall on a spectrum from temporally minimalist to temporally maximalist. In some cases, the court avoids
confronting the question, which only emphasizes the need for
methodological order.
1. Temporally Minimalist. — Some courts treat the issue in a temporally minimalist way. That is, their decisions exude deference to legislatures and the formal processes of legislation in a way that
minimizes the relevance of similar past policies. These courts focus on
whether the substance, procedural history, or enactor of a T2 policy is
at all different from those aspects of a T1 policy. For them, changes
reflected in and resulting from the formal procedures of lawmaking
justify applying conventional scrutiny to the policy under review,
notwithstanding its past. None of these courts expressly deem the past
irrelevant. But what does the work is whether the T2 policy can be
seen as different, and if so, the discriminatory predecessor recedes into
the background.
An apt recent example, Abbott v. Perez,72 blasted the idea that
“taint” associated with Texas’s 2011 redistricting maps determined the
validity of 2013 maps based (in part) on the 2011 maps.73 To be sure,
the Court acknowledged that if the 2011 maps were discriminatory,
that would be “relevant” to the ultimate question of whether the 2013
districting plans were unconstitutional.74 But it condemned the lower
court’s use of taint as having wrongly “reversed the [plaintiff’s] burden
of proof” to show that the 2013 legislature acted with discriminatory
taint.75 And it is hard to find in the majority opinion’s lengthy re-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
72
73
74
75

138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
See id. at 2324–25.
Id.; see also id. at 2327.
Id. at 2325.
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weighing of the record any reference to, or use of, the district court’s
finding that the 2011 plans were discriminatory.76
The minimalist approach lurked in Trump v. Hawaii77 as well.
After Donald Trump’s campaign-trail calls for “a total and complete
shutdown” of Muslim immigration,78 his Administration instituted
three successive restrictions on foreign-national entry that — to varying degrees — targeted majority-Muslim countries. Ban 3 followed
the judicial blocking of Ban 1 and the partial judicial blocking of Ban
2’s temporary restrictions.79 All bans asserted the same goal, pursued
in the same facially neutral manner: combat terrorist threats through
limitations on the entry of foreign nationals.80 All, plaintiffs said,
actually violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of preferring
one religion over another.81
Given the Court’s “assum[ption]” that it might consider “extrinsic
evidence,”82 context (such as candidate Trump’s statements and the
policy’s disparate religious effect) could cast doubt on a facially neutral
action.83 Lower courts that invalidated those bans had followed that
course.84 The third ban, however, presented a potential complication.
Unlike its predecessors, it followed a worldwide review undertaken pursuant to Ban 2, included two countries that are not majority-Muslim,
and removed two majority-Muslim countries included in Ban 1.85
Those differences seemed to matter. To be sure, the Court never
said that the modifications saved Ban 3. But it did emphasize the
“persuasive evidence” that the ban rested on legitimate national security concerns — evidence that appeared primarily to be findings generated by the “worldwide” multiagency review and the revision of Ban 3
compared to Ban 1.86 Nor did it ever hint that the prior “uninsulated”
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 See id. at 2326–30. Perhaps such reweighing was improper, see id. at 2356 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting), but it occurred and is thus worth scrutinizing.
77 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
78 See id. at 2417.
79 See id. at 2403–05 (recounting the development of bans in tandem with litigation challenges
and noting expiration of Ban 2’s temporary measures).
80 Compare id. at 2403 (first ban titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
into the United States”), with id. at 2404 (third ban titled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other PublicSafety Threats”).
81 See id. at 2406.
82 Id. at 2420; see also id. at 2419–20. It “assumed” this after first flirting with saying that
national security precedent barred considering any such evidence. See id.
83 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005).
84 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1135–36 (D. Haw. 2017).
85 See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2404–05 (describing worldwide review and new inclusion of North
Korea and Venezuela); id. at 2422 (describing removal of majority-Muslim countries). Chad, a
third majority-Muslim country, was removed from Ban 3 postinception pursuant to the order’s
review process. See id. at 2406.
86 Id. at 2421.
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policies affected the disposition. In short, the Court was able to deploy
benign context unique to Ban 3 against the damning context common
to all bans.87 It could do so only by minimizing the earlier bans’ import, a move that itself was facilitated by the last ban’s
distinctions.
Important lower court examples of temporal minimalism also exist.88 Three circuits have considered a felon disenfranchisement law
that had been revised and replaced in some form over time.89 All
acknowledged (or assumed) that an earlier version of the provision
reflected racial bias, but nevertheless validated the current provision.
The reasoning is notable. One court implied that merely amending the
provision to remove burglary from the list of disenfranchising crimes
sufficed to “supersede[] the previous provision and remove[] the
discriminatory taint associated with the original version.”90 Another
placed dispositive purgative weight on an 1894 provision’s removal of
a sunset provision that was included in that provision’s three (discriminatory) predecessors.91 A third was satisfied that a century-later
revision’s modification of the class disenfranchised under its predecessor was a “substantive[] alter[ation]”92 and reenactment, to be validated absent independent contemporaneous evidence of bias.93
Some lower court voter ID cases have also taken this approach.
After a federal district court invalidated an earlier voter ID law, Texas
passed a new law ostensibly intended to cure any legal defects.94 After
the district court invalidated the new law because it was a “vestige” of
the earlier one,95 the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “unless
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
87 See Landau, supra note 1, at 2173 (“The more the government could show its policy was
thoroughly vetted, the less the President’s disparaging remarks about Islam seemed to undermine
the case for deference.”).
88 Reaching back further could produce more cases, but my goal here is illustrative, not
exhaustive.
89 See Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 164–65, 167 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Florida, 405
F.3d 1214, 1223–25 (11th Cir. 2005); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
90 Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391. The court also emphasized a later amendment that added murder
and rape to the list — “crimes historically excluded from the list because they were not considered
‘black’ crimes.” Id. (The additions, incidentally, seem equally consistent with approval of the
original plan and desire to make it work “better.”) In any event, the court was clear that “each
amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discriminatory taint.” Id.
(emphasis added).
91 Hayden, 594 F.3d at 164–67 (finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged discriminatory purpose underlying the 1821, 1846, and 1874 constitutional provisions that required the legislature to
pass a disenfranchisement law at the next legislative session (but that made that choice permissive
thereafter), but concluding that the 1894 provision’s removal of that sunset provision “substantively change[d]” the provision enough to sever any inferential link, id. at 167).
92 Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1225.
93 See id. at 1221–25.
94 See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 795–97 (5th Cir. 2018).
95 Id. at 798.
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remedial legislation . . . is itself infected with a discriminatory purpose,
federal courts are obliged to defer to the legislative remedy.”96
Critically, in its view, “substantial, race-neutral alterations in an old
unconstitutional law may remove the discriminatory taint.”97 Similarly, a North Carolina voter ID case closely tracked Abbott in casting a
lower court’s discussion of taint as an improper shifting of the burden
of proof.98 Like Abbott, that case paid lip service to Arlington
Heights’s historical-background factor, but said almost nothing that
took seriously the possible continuity between old and new laws.99
The minimalist approach is thus well established. What makes
these cases minimalist, to be clear, is not that they ignore historical
context. What places them at this pole is their parsimonious approach
to treating policy continuity as meaningful. That approach seems to
stem from distaste for the idea of shackling the present with the past.
Broadly speaking, that orientation means these courts treat substantive
change effected through formal lawmaking procedures as sufficient to
discharge any taint of the distasteful past.
2. Temporally Maximalist. — The Grandfather Clause and White
Primary Cases offer temporally maximalist attention to the realities of
how a particular practice came to be “over[] time.”100 More recent
examples are also available.
One is Flowers v. Mississippi.101 The background: In five trials
over roughly a decade,102 District Attorney Doug Evans engaged in a
pattern of racially disparate strikes in jury selection, with his prosecutorial misconduct generating three reversals, including one on Batson
grounds.103 At jury selection for his sixth attempt at convicting Curtis
Flowers, Evans used five of his six peremptory strikes against Black
jurors.104 Under these “extraordinary facts,” the Court found a Batson
violation.105

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
96
97

Id. at 800.
Id. at 802 (citing Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391–92 (5th Cir. 1998)). This phrasing at
least seems to concede that a new law could theoretically be tainted.
98 See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 303–05 (4th Cir. 2020)
(reversing the district court’s invalidation of a 2018 voter ID law that followed a 2013 law’s invalidation by the Fourth Circuit).
99 See id. at 302–11 (restricting discussion of historical background to a general passing
reference to the state’s “historical background favor[ing] finding discriminatory intent,” id. at 305).
Section I.C.2, pp. 1207–10, discusses a bit of maximalism that peeked through.
100 Pildes, supra note 23, at 2.
101 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
102 See Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082, 1093 (Miss. 2017).
103 Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236–38.
104 Id. at 2237.
105 Id. at 2235.
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But what was so extraordinary? Evans gave facially coherent
reasons for every strike.106 Batson aficionados know well that providing such reasons is usually not difficult and usually sufficient to rebuff
a challenge.107 What’s more, a Black juror was actually seated in
Flowers’s sixth trial.108 One can easily imagine an opinion nodding to
the history but stressing that the task was to determine the constitutionality of these strikes, made under different circumstances for different reasons. Instead, the majority held that the racial disparities of
past strikes in past trials coupled with multiple past Batson violations
by this same state actor mattered significantly to the question of
discriminatory intent in this trial.109
Here, too, lower court maximalist exemplars exist. Although (as
noted above) the litigation terminated in a largely minimalist
decision,110 the maximalist approach manifested twice in the recent litigation over North Carolina’s voter ID law. In 2018, North Carolina’s
legislature implemented a recent ballot measure requiring voter identification.111 The ballot measure followed the Fourth Circuit’s holding multiple provisions of a 2013 voter ID law to be racially discriminatory.112
Initially, a district court invalidated the implementing law’s voter
ID provisions.113 Its context-laden opinion emphasized pre-2013 history, substantial identity between legislative supporters of the two bills,
legislative statements indicating disagreement with the first bill’s invalidation and desire to protect the new bill from constitutional challenges, and the maintenance of elements the Fourth Circuit had found
problematic.114 Despite new provisions that “could significantly limit”
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
106 See id. at 2251–52 (Alito, J., concurring) (claiming the reasons for the strikes “were not only
facially legitimate but . . . would be of concern to a great many attorneys,” id. at 2251, and asserting that in the usual case they would pass muster); id. at 2253 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (listing
reasons).
107 See, e.g., Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 787 & n.3 (2020) [hereinafter Frampton, For Cause] (collecting studies on the persistence of racially disparate peremptory strikes); Thomas Ward
Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1626–27 (2018) [hereinafter Frampton,
Jim Crow Jury].
108 See Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2246.
109 See id. at 2245–46, 2250–51; see also id. at 2234, 2236 (emphasizing the identity of the prosecutor); id. at 2251 (Alito, J., concurring) (same); Paul Butler, Mississippi Goddamn: Flowers v.
Mississippi’s Cheap Racial Justice, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 73, 80 (emphasizing the decision’s contextual grounding).
110 See supra p. 1207.
111 See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2020); see also
Johnson v. Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005).
112 See Raymond, 981 F.3d at 299 (citing N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d
204, 216–18 (4th Cir. 2016)). The legislature submitted the ballot measure.
113 See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 53 (M.D.N.C. 2019).
114 See id. at 29–35. On the last point, specifically, the new law addressed the disparate treatment of absentee and in-person voting the Fourth Circuit had noted, but did not alter the
rejection of public-assistance IDs as acceptable identification. See id. at 34.
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the new law’s disparate impact,115 the court emphasized that the expansion of eligible IDs “continue[d] to primarily include IDs which
minority voters disproportionately lack” and exclude those which
nonwhite voters were more likely to have.116 So, although the new law
changed enough to not be a “barely disguised duplicate” of the old,117
the court concluded that the legislature had declined to “cleanse the
discriminatory taint” of the old law and instead attempted to
circumvent the Fourth Circuit’s opinion.118
That approach to locating and cognizing problematic continuity
epitomizes maximalism. I noted the Fourth Circuit’s largely minimalist reversal above. One piece of its analysis, however, deviated. In the
court’s view, the “interject[ion]” of the statewide electorate,119 through
the ballot measure postdating the 2013 law, “undermined
the . . . link[]” between the old and new.120 In contemplating the possibility that the link might matter, and looking to the specifics of the
policies’ relationship to examine whether it did, the court reasoned in a
temporally maximalist way.
Similarly, a district court rejected the minimalist approach in evaluating 8 U.S.C. § 1326’s criminalization of the reentry of certain
removed aliens.121 Both parties agreed that proscribed motives
animated the provision’s initial enactment in 1929.122 The provision,
however, had been reenacted six times over the next sixty-seven years,
with alterations to penalties and scope.123 Drawing on Abbott and the
circuit-court felony-disenfranchisement cases, the government argued
that any reenactment per se rendered the tainted origins irrelevant.124
The court disagreed. In its view, 1929 mattered both as historical
background (in the Arlington Heights sense) and because the original
discrimination “infect[ed]” subsequent policies.125 The key symptom, it
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115
116
117

Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 43 (quoting Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 10, Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15 (No. 18-cv-01034), ECF No. 91).
118 Id.
119 N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 305 (4th Cir. 2020).
120 Id. at 306.
121 See United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, No. 20-cr-00026, 2021 WL 3667330, at *1, *9 (D. Nev.
Aug. 18, 2021).
122 Id. at *7.
123 See id. at *4 n.11, *23–24.
124 See id. at *9 & n.19.
125 Id. at *9–10. For unclear reasons, the court focused primarily on 1929’s relevance to the
1952 reenactment, rather than the subsequent policies. See id. at *4 n.10; see also *9–18. In my
view, more front-end energy was warranted to explain why the infection had persisted to the
present. It appears that an underelaborated piece of the reasoning was that the later policies also
lacked substantial alteration from the 1929 and 1952 versions. See id. at *23–24; see also infra
p. 1210.
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concluded, was the lack of “substantial[] alter[ation]” over time.126
The policy’s alterations were not to the contrary; no later Congress
had “confronted” the problematic roots, and no alterations had
“changed [the law’s] function” or “functional operation.”127 Coupled
with additional evidence of proscribed motivations in 1952, this infection invalidated the present-day provision. Other district courts
considering this provision and its sibling provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1325,
have reached the opposite conclusion, often explicitly embracing the
idea that the passage of time rendered the initial law’s wrongfulness
minimally relevant.128
3. The Muddle. — These admittedly high-level labels aim to
outline the landscape, not to imply perfect distinctions in approach.
One can always debate categorization. Take Flowers. District
Attorney Evans was a constant in every trial. Perhaps Flowers is thus
only maximalist in an anodyne way dependent on a willingness to assume considerable individual motivational continuity over time. That
willingness, perhaps, might be less forthcoming where that sort of individualized continuity is less likely (such as multimember
institutions). That critique cannot be overstated, though; people, like
institutions, change over time.129
More importantly, my claim does not require two crisply
demarcated categorical approaches. The point, in fact, is that the categories are not clean, with the diversity itself indicating need for further analysis. After all, one could frame Trump as involving individualized continuity no less than Flowers — but the government won the
former and lost the latter. Perhaps the best demonstration of a lack of
consensus lies in recent cases where a standard approach would have
helped, if one existed.
For example, when it considered a nonunanimous jury provision in
Ramos v. Louisiana,130 the Court made sure to emphasize that the
provision’s forbearer was adopted with racist intent and effect.131 But
the Court’s Sixth Amendment resolution failed to specify why that historical relationship mattered.132 Two months later, Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue133 reversed an application of a state
constitutional provision restricting aid to religious schools; its
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126
127
128

See id. at *10.
Id. at *24; see also id. at *23–25.
See, e.g., United States v. Machic-Xiap, No. 19-cr-407, 2021 WL 3362738, at *1–2, *15 (D.
Or. Aug. 3, 2021) (considering section 1326); United States v. Rios-Montano, No. 19-CR-2123,
2020 WL 7226441, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020) (considering section 1325).
129 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 16, at 1373 n.211.
130 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
131 See id. at 1394.
132 Id. at 1426–27 (Alito, J., dissenting) (raising this objection).
133 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).

2022]

DISCRIMINATORY TAINT

1211

predecessor provision modeled a failed federal constitutional amendment motivated by anti-Catholic animus.134 Espinoza noted the history, but said nothing about whether it might inform the analysis.135
Further emphasizing the range of thought, two Justices who
concurred in both cases to discuss the predecessor found themselves on
functionally different sides: Justice Alito stressed the discriminatory
predecessor in Espinoza and argued against its relevance in Ramos,
while Justice Sotomayor did the opposite.136 I do not mean to imply
disingenuousness. As I will argue, taint is context-sensitive, and one
might well conclude (and both Justices attempted to show) that it is
more outcome determinative in one of these cases than the other. My
point is simply that the lack of consensus on approach generates
significant differences in engagement even among those who are willing to acknowledge that a discriminatory predecessor might matter.
* * *
The cases confirm the prevalence of allegedly discriminatory
antecedents. They also confirm the law’s undeveloped state, notwithstanding the broad judicial understanding that context matters.
Courts never ignore history. But what they fail to do is apply a consistent theoretical framework to that history that permits robust evaluation of policy continuity. One can, perhaps, excuse them for failing
to apply what does not exist. History, especially a problematic predecessor, surely matters. But because we do not agree on why, how, or
what it takes to cancel it out, courts invariably operate in a critically
undertheorized way. This issue is too important — and too certain to
persist — for us not to do better. Accordingly, the next Part pulls
together the strands of theory embedded in the cases, explains why
they matter, and employs them to construct a framework that can help
judicial and nonjudicial actors better organize and systematize their
analysis of discriminatory predecessors.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
134
135
136

See id. at 2268–69, 2271 (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 2258–59 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2259 (stating only that “the historical record is ‘complex’”).
Compare id. at 2273 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing textual and impact continuity from
T1 to T2, disputing that the provision was “cleansed of its bigoted past” and arguing that “it . . .
does not matter whether Montana readopted the . . . provision for benign reasons”), and Ramos,
140 S. Ct. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting) (treating the jury provision’s origins as irrelevant), with id.
at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that the jury provision’s origins are “worthy of . . .
attention” because of the provision’s persistent discriminatory effects and the reenacting legislature’s failure to “grapple[] with the laws’ sordid history”), and Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2293 n.2
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reenacting legislature sufficiently engaged the past
and that some Catholics supported the reenactment).
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II. THE MISSING PIECE: DISCRIMINATORY TAINT
A crisper concept of “taint” can demystify many of the recurring
problems of temporality and change. This Part looks to broader
principles of legal continuity to build a better descriptive account that
reflects and ties together the key recurring problems in discriminatory
predecessor cases.
A. Legal Continuity, Meaning, and Responsibility
A step back from doctrine may help. Professor Richard Pildes has
offered a useful public law taxonomy for describing whether and how
much contingent context should shape evaluation of government
action. An approach based on “institutional realism” focuses on how
an institution “actually function[s] in, and over, time.”137 Its antonym,
“institutional formalism,” treats institutions in a “black box” manner:
“intentionally ignor[ing]” contingent institutional features, including
the institution’s previous behavior in substantially similar circumstances.138 When faced with this tension, Pildes notes, courts are “all
over the map.”139 That aptly summarizes section I.C’s portrait of
courts addressing allegedly discriminatory predecessors.
This clash is unsurprising. Our constitutional tradition empowers
new democratic actors to set new courses.140 Formalism advances that
end when it declines to impugn facially legitimate actions with “more
contingent, specific features of institutional behavior.”141 Formalism
also embraces the rule-of-law benefits of treating (formally) like cases
alike.142 These are real benefits. Yet institutions transcend their
present personnel.143 Formally “new” institutional actors had predecessors whose actions shaped the institutional world their successors
occupy, in ways that empower and constrain.144
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Pildes, supra note 23, at 2.
See id.
Id. at 37.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25, at 128; Super, supra note 16, at 77–78.
Pildes, supra note 23, at 2.
See id. at 7; Gowder, supra note 20, at 1023–24.
See, e.g., Anna Stilz, Collective Responsibility and the State, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 193, 196
(2011). The essence of that transcendence is, naturally, the subject of contestation, but I take as a
given the broad acceptance that it is true in some sense. See, e.g., Kendy Hess, The Unrecognized
Consensus About Firm Moral Responsibility, in THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 170–
71, 182–84 (Eric W. Orts & N. Craig Smith eds., 2017).
144 See Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek, Institutions and Intercurrence: Theory Building in
the Fullness of Time, in NOMOS XXXVIII: POLITICAL ORDER 111, 140–41 (Ian Shapiro &
Russell Hardin eds., 1996); Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1178 (2020); ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 294–95, 299, 301–02, 309–13 (1997) (noting medieval application of the principle of “identity despite changes” to states, id. at 311);
Natasha Wheatley, Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of
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That much is broadly uncontroversial. For example, public law
remedies for government wrongdoing often constrain what later
officials may do.145 Decisionmakers for corporations and marketparticipant governments can contractually bind their successors.146
And some government decisions (like exploiting nonrenewable
resources) are simply irreversible, whatever later actors may prefer.
But the common thread in these easier cases is a T1 commitment to
courses of action that inherently outrun the decisionmakers’ tenure,
like an ongoing contractual relationship or logging of a forest. It is
more controversial to suggest that some aspect of a T1 action can outlive that action’s formal demise to generate constraints on nonidentical
T2 action.
A formalist response to that suggestion might simply say T1 does
not “constrain” T2 at all, or only can if it is probative of T2 decisionmakers having behaved impermissibly. On this view, the time to
address T1 was when it was in force. Now that it is not, discussion of
wrongfulness should be addressed to its replacement. Surely this
response is sometimes appropriate.147 Institutional realism, though,
can justify a richer inquiry: whether T1’s validity and its relationship
to T2 independently impeaches T2.
As it turns out, it is unnecessary to rely on institutional realism in
the abstract. It points toward an amply precedented approach.
Across various areas, the law often recognizes that formal separateness
and nonidentity may not bar the intertemporal transmission of blameworthiness. The common element in these disparate approaches is the
recognition that substantial continuity matters. Responsibility may
depend on what a discrete event relates to over time within its
institutional context.
To make this more concrete, consider some institutional examples.
In corporate law, “[a] corporation that acquires, merges with, consolidates with, or spins off from a criminal corporation automatically
inherits a criminal taint.”148 Continuity can affect corporate civil lia–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Not Being a State, 35 LAW & HIST. REV. 753, 774 (2017) (citing Professor Ernst Kantorowicz’s
analysis of the concept of “the state as legal corporation”); David Ciepley, Is the U.S. Government
a Corporation? The Corporate Origins of Modern Constitutionalism, 111 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418,
423 (2017).
145 See Parker, supra note 8, at 1161–62.
146 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 739–44 (2010); see
also ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION, AND
LEGITIMACY IN MODERN FINANCE 1–4, 10–11 (2014) (discussing “norm of sovereign debt continuity” — “that sovereign states should repay debt even after a major regime change,” id. at 2).
147 See Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHIL. (Simon Blackburn ed.,
3d ed. 2016), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780198735304.001.0001/
acref-9780198735304-e-2448 [https://perma.cc/4S37-9RWF] (noting the “fallacy of arguing that because one event happened after another, it happened because of it”).
148 Mihailis E. Diamantis, Successor Identity, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 4 (2019).
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bility under similar circumstances, too.149 Similarly, one district attorney’s nonprosecution promises have constrained successors’ ability to
decide otherwise.150 Even the innocuous concept of stare decisis
counts: courts face otherwise inapplicable constraints on some cases’
resolution merely because of resolutions in a “previous similar case” —
here, “the past is supposed to govern the present.”151
Continuity-related responsibility for natural persons tracks the
treatment of artificial persons. Accordingly, many criminal law doctrines transmute otherwise blameworthy acts into blameless acts
“because [they are] rooted in or determined by factors that preceded
the criminal incident.”152 Duress and insanity are two well-known examples.153 The opposite is also true; consider conspiracy law. There,
B’s prior entry into an enterprise with A may make B culpable for
blameworthy acts A takes growing out of that enterprise.154 Theories
of implied-in-law contracts or unjust enrichment can be understood
similarly, as rendering otherwise legitimate enrichment impermissible
based on preceding conduct.155 Indeed, across diverse settings, responsibility determinations are shaped by a treatment of two or more
temporally separated events as continuous, or not.156
In short, while maintaining a commitment to connecting blameworthiness to culpability, the law has long understood culpability flexibly.
In doing so, it often recognizes that continuity between past and
present discrete acts informs (or, if you like, constrains) the validity or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 4 JAMES COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 22:8 (3d ed. 2020) (observing “well recognized exemptions” to the rule that a corporation that
purchases another corporation’s assets is not subject to the selling corporation’s liabilities,
including where the transaction is a “de facto merger” or “when the surviving company carries
forward a common identity with the selling corporation”); 15 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 7123.20 (discussing similar continuity-based “continuity of
enterprise” and “continuation of business” doctrines).
150 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cosby, 252 A.3d 1092, 1130–31, 1136 & n.24, 1144 (Pa. 2021).
151 Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Writing History and Registering Memory in Legal
Decisions and Legal Practices: An Introduction, in HISTORY, MEMORY, AND THE LAW 1, 4
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2002); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (joint opinion) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own
Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” (emphasis added)).
152 Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 611 (1981); see also Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609,
611–12 (1984).
153 See Kelman, supra note 152, at 611.
154 Robinson, supra note 152, at 617, 665–68. I thank Professor Aziz Huq for suggesting this
example.
155 See, e.g., Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1064–65 (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing
implied-in-law contracts); Town of New Hartford v. Conn. Res. Recovery Auth., 970 A.2d 592,
611–13, 611 n.25 (Conn. 2009) (same).
156 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 229–33, 241–43
(1990).
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meaning of later-in-time acts. This can occur even when such acts are
formally separated and substantively distinct, and it does not depend
on a T2 actor’s willing endorsement or embrace of those constraints.
From this perspective, the anti-continuity embraced in many recent
constitutional law cases seems more like an outlier.157 At the very
least, continuity’s recurrence in legal responsibility determinations
should caution against dismissing it in the constitutional discrimina
tory predecessor context.158 Any attempt to resolve the uncertainty
section I.C describes should recognize as much. The question of how
much constitutional significance we should afford policy continuity is,
at least, an open one.
The old tension between realism and formalism cannot be resolved
jurispathically.159 We need both, inside and outside constitutional law.
Deciding which should drive our approach to constitutional law continuity must draw on some normative priors.160 I turn now to sketching
some priors that counsel in favor of temporally maximalist realism in
this context.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157 See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–25 (2018); cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570
U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating a VRA provision that restricted voting changes by certain Southern
states based on a formula pegged to past state conduct); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Supreme
Court, 2020 Term — Foreword: Regime Change, 135 HARV. L. REV. 1, 144 (2021)
(arguing that Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021), “continue[d] the line of
thought [the Court] began in Shelby County, of downplaying the discriminatory effects of voting
rules by divorcing the state laws under its consideration from any history of discrimination”);
Boddie, supra note 16, at 1289–90; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Court’s
Voting-Rights Decision Was Worse than People Think, THE ATLANTIC (July 8, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/brnovich-vra-scotus-decision-arizona-votingright/619330 [https://perma.cc/4NHE-JJR8] (describing Brnovich as embodying a recent “impulse” in election law cases to “unmoor the present from the country’s history of racial
discrimination”).
158 Constitutional theorists have often advocated greater attention to history and continuity, see
Siegel, supra note 16, at 2119 (articulating a “preservation through transformation” theory for
“regime[s]”), but have not emphasized the uniqueness of T1/T2 policy relationships, see Driver,
supra note 17, at 943 (discussing backups, which do pose the T1/T2 fact pattern, but for reasons
not focused on their temporal aspects). Opponents of greater attention to history have often emphasized amorphousness problems. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Canary-Blind Constitution:
Must Government Ignore Racial Inequality?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53, 64–65 (2016);
Boddie, supra note 16, at 1279.
159 Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (observing a judicial “jurispathic” role in “suppres[sing]” one view of
the law in favor of another); Pildes, supra note 23, at 53–54.
160 See Levinson, supra note 16, at 1372, 1375–76; cf. Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air:
Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381, 1388 (2014) (observing the
private law truism that “legal ‘causation’ does not refer to an objective phenomenon but is instead a legal conclusion informed by normative judgments”).
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B. Guiding Principles
Perhaps surprisingly, wide agreement exists regarding the general
principles that support a temporally maximalist approach to the taint
problem: effectuating constitutional mandates requires, among other
things, that they are not evaded through artifice and that past
unconstitutional conduct is not extended into the present.
Consider evasion. Here, courts have long aimed to extinguish bad
faith attempts to comply with the form but not the substance of constitutional rules.
Indeed, so-called “anti-evasion” doctrines occur
throughout constitutional law, reflecting a sense that constitutional
rules are not made to be broken.161 Most disagreements concern what
should be deemed evasion.
The past’s extension into the present poses some thornier questions.
Sometimes constitutional law takes this quite seriously, despite the
Supreme Court’s recent anti-continuity strain.162 For example, detecting unconstitutional discrimination authorizes a court not just to
enjoin the discrimination but to ensure the eradication of its effects.163
Disputes here are over how far courts may go in eradicating.164
Similarly, the Court has recognized that remedying the effects of past
discrimination (public or private) is a compelling interest, at least if
identified with specificity.165 Here, the nuanced cases involve whether
express government use of racial categories to craft such remedies survives strict scrutiny.166 But the interest qualifies as compelling irrespective of whether the Court thinks a particular means of pursuing
the interest passes constitutional muster.
These principles generate difficult questions at the margins. But
incompletely theorized agreements on the general principle still can
generate a sophisticated means of evaluating facially neutral governmental acts with discrete, specific past discriminatory predecessors.167
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
161 Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law,
2012 UTAH L. REV. 1773, 1779; see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role
of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).
162 See sources cited supra note 157.
163 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Douglas Laycock, The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 718 (1990) (“[G]overnment defendants who
are immune from damages are subject to reparative and structural injunctions ordering them to
undo the consequences of past wrongs.” (footnote omitted)).
164 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the
passage of time necessarily implies the dissipation of a constitutional violation’s effects); cf.
Levinson, supra note 16, at 1354–55.
165 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996).
166 See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 25, at 1128–30.
167 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1739
(1995) (discussing the phenomenon of “comfortable . . . agreement on a general principle” notwithstanding the possibility of “disagreement about [some] particular cases”).
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We need not specify the precise limits of proper governmental responses to what the Supreme Court calls historical “societal discrimination.”168 Nor is consensus necessary on how often governments may
voluntarily use race-conscious curative measures. We can build on the
wide agreement that specific past acts of wrongdoing can, but should
not, extend themselves into the present and that governments should
not be permitted to do indirectly what they cannot do directly.
Any nonarbitrary decision about how the law should treat time and
continuity involves value judgments.169 Those whose judgments differ
from mine may reach different conclusions. Here, though, more consensus exists than one might first think. Enough exists, at least, to
recognize that the relationship between some modern government acts
and some earlier discriminatory government acts may be uniquely relevant to the modern acts’ validity. This Article’s remainder takes up
the task of defining and justifying that relevance as a constitutional
antidiscrimination concept.
C. Two Types of (Potential) Taint
Before drawing on the foregoing principles to animate a better descriptive account of taint, it is worth pausing to highlight an important
taxonomical point they facilitate. Every case in section I.C at least
plausibly implicated legal continuity and the possibility of persistent
past wrongful discrimination. Phrased that way, section I.C reveals an
unappreciated genus of cases involving ostensibly discriminatory
predecessor policies.
Yet section I.C also reveals an important species-level distinction
within that genus. On one hand are cases like Ramos and Espinoza,
where the T1 is quite far away, with complete decisionmaker turnover
within the relevant institution. Call these “distant” cases. On the
other hand are cases like Trump and Abbott, where the T2 closely
follows the T1, often with substantial or complete decisionmaker identity within the relevant institution. Call these “compressed” cases.
Part of the problem any taint concept must resolve — and probably the source of some of the methodological muddle — lies in uncertainty about how the taint idea would apply to these related but
distinguishable species. In distant cases, how powerful should the
mere passage of time be? (For example, does a taint claim’s force
necessarily dissipate with time?) In compressed cases, what does the
compactness tell us — is it relevant only to potential, proscribed T2 in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
168
169

Shaw, 517 U.S. at 910.
See Balkin, supra note 156, at 262–63; Levinson, supra note 16, at 1315–16, 1375–76. See
generally Kelman, supra note 152, at 593–95, 638–39, 666–67.
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tentions, or is there some sense in which the T2 situation can be questioned irrespective of intent?
In describing taint, then, I am sensitive to this distinction. Yet
because the types exist within a genus, my proposal simultaneously
recognizes that distant and compact cases manifest the same problem,
on different scales. A unified genus-level approach is worth pursuing.
D. Describing Taint
I turn now to proposing an approach to discriminatory descent
problems, with these principles and taxonomy in hand. The key firstcut need is a better definition of a tainted relationship. We can’t know
how to treat taint until we agree on what we mean when we invoke it.
I propose a less deferential approach that nevertheless preserves the
possibility that a contemporary policy is legitimate despite relevant
discriminatory history.
Relevance matters. By analogy, just as we do not treat the big
bang (for example) as a legally relevant cause, not every public act that
occurred before the putative T2 is relevant to a taint analysis.170 This
distinction is important for nonidentical later-in-time policies. Take
the example of the nonunanimous jury provision from Ramos.171 It
might be academically interesting to show that, given the right
policy relationship, this past policy could inform responsibility determinations for the present one. But it would be almost entirely
academic if the relationship became irrelevant were Louisiana merely
to reenact the provision but change the number of jurors needed for a
conviction from nine to ten.172 Such a trivial move should not be
dispositive. But saying that much requires some sort of heuristic for
ascertaining how much similarity taint requires.
An analogous problem from mootness law can help rationalize an
approach. Some cases require deciding whether a supposedly new
governmental policy is different enough from a policy it replaced that
it moots litigation on the older policy. Thus, in a case challenging a
city’s affirmative action ordinance, repealed and replaced with a
similar ordinance on the same subject, the Court looked to the “gravamen” of the pending complaint and rejected mootness because the
new ordinance “disadvantage[d]” the plaintiffs “in the same fundamen–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170 See Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725,
791 n.207 (2019) (observing that, depending on scope, “every feature of the universe [is] a but-for
cause” (emphasis omitted)); Alexandra D. Lahav, Essay, Chancy Causation in Tort Law, J. TORT
L. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (observing
that beyond causation’s “irreducible factual core: that an event has a tendency to produce an outcome,” legal causation reflects “policy choices used to achieve normative goals”).
171 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020).
172 As Louisiana did. See, e.g., id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting); State v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d
1028, 1038 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
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tal way.”173 The idea is that mootness doctrine would become an evasion doctrine if insubstantial changes extinguished any challenge to a
Similarly, in the search for a tainted
policy’s substance.174
relationship, we can look to the gravamen of the policies and to the
sorts of claims plaintiffs at either time might have raised.175
Edge cases are inevitable. Those are the price of an antidiscrimination approach that responds to the reality that wrongful discrimination is initially undertaken for a reason that may persist through
time.176 But it is workable to ask whether the T2 policy acts upon, or
operates within, the world in the same way as the supposed T1. That
is, we should ask whether an intertemporal policy relationship’s
characteristics demonstrate the kind of distinctive continuity that the
law often treats as relevant to responsibility.177
Three factors apparent in section I.C’s cases can guide that inquiry.
Their presence distinguishes mere post hoc temporal relationships
from those suggesting responsibility-laden policy continuity.
An important threshold note: I postpone to section V.A.2 the
possibility that the government might dispute the original policy’s
wrongfulness. Assuming (I think reasonably) that some older policies
are wrongful, the first question is whether we can detect meaningful
continuity between such policies and modern successors. The second
question is whether and to what extent such continuity drives constitutional responsibility. To be sure, if we can answer those antecedent
questions, the resolution of disputes over the nature of original policies

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
173 Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 662 (1993); see also id. at 660–63; id. at 662 n.3 (framing the question as whether the new
ordinance “is sufficiently similar to the repealed ordinance that it is permissible to say that the
challenged conduct continues”).
174 See id. at 662; see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 901
F.3d 356, 361–63 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding no mootness where the plaintiffs were disadvantaged in
the “same fundamental way,” id. at 362, under a new advertisement policy); 13C CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.6, at 281 & n.32 (3d ed. 2008).
175 Cf. Levinson, supra note 16, at 1372–73 (arguing that, in the public law context, questions of
proper “aggregation [of harms and benefits] over time . . . usually take the form of a nexus or
germaneness test” and offering examples).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 747 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[D]iscriminatory intent does tend to persist through time . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 26, at 956
(“Understanding what is wrong with discrimination may require some tolerance for relatively
vague notions; there is no guarantee that the prohibition against discrimination can be expressed
in a way that is not somewhat vague.”).
177 I generally speak in terms of distinctive continuity, but not much would change if this were
viewed in causation terms, that is, as an argument about what we ought to recognize as the constitutionally pertinent results of a discriminatory predecessor. See Lahav, supra note 170 (manuscript at 3).
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may affect the set of cases when taint is relevant. But the set will not
be empty.178
1. Same Function. — Drawing on the mootness analogy, tainted
relationships require the subsequent government act to carry forward
the predecessor’s functional operation. The easiest example is the T2
reenactment of an exact duplicate. Such a case is essentially indistinguishable from a provision untouched since its inception, maintaining
its effects.179 It is easiest to see here how the technically new law
“brings the old soil with it.”180 I do not claim these cases are common.
Note, though, that this already illuminates the old futility objection
from Palmer v. Thompson181: a law repassed in identical form for “different reasons” may be distinguished from an identical, clean-slated
new law precisely because it was (1) repassed (2) in that form.182
While it surely is not difficult to avoid enacting an exact duplicate,
the extreme case is a small step from acknowledging that a
nonidentical later policy may functionally replicate a predecessor’s
real-world operation. Indeed, we expect legislatures to update and
amend laws because the original law’s impetus may, in the main, persist. A realist approach will examine the benefits and burdens the
provisions distribute, and the way in which they do so.183 Thus, the
nonunanimous jury rule from Ramos functionally duplicated the
original nonunanimous rule, notwithstanding minor changes.184 So too
for the North Carolina voter ID law passed after a previous ID law’s
invalidation.185
A hypothetical case may elucidate this factor’s limits. Suppose
that, a few years after Ramos, Louisiana gives prosecutors double the
peremptory strikes defense attorneys have.186 Insofar as nonunanimous juries “allow[ed] backdoor and unreviewable peremptory
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
178 As section V.A.1 notes, if the original policy’s wrongfulness is implausible, a court would
properly decline to entertain a claim premised on a taint theory.
179 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227–30, 232–33 (1985); see also supra note 64.
180 Cf. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2331 (2019) (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570
U.S. 729, 733 (2013)) (discussing meaning implications of transplanted statutory phrasing).
181 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
182 See id.
183 See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 662 n.3 (1993) (inquiring whether the “new ordinance is sufficiently similar to the repealed ordinance” that it presents the same controversy).
184 The reenactment reduced the number of allowable dissenting jurors from three to two and
expanded the carveout for cases requiring unanimity. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1426 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); State v. Hankton, 122 So. 3d 1028, 1038 (La. Ct. App.
2013).
185 See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26 (M.D.N.C. 2019)
(citing N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir. 2016)).
186 This would alter the current Louisiana framework, which allots both sides the same number
of peremptory strikes. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 799 (2021) (giving both sides same
number).
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strikes,”187 continuity might seem plausible, especially given prosecutorial strikes’ racially disparate effects.188 Nevertheless, although the
setting is suspicious and probably warrants a conventional equal
protection challenge, the policies are insufficiently similar for taint.
The first diluted minority-juror influence. The second (by hypothesis)
concedes a minority juror’s ability to torpedo a guilty verdict but
affords prosecutors more front-end power to affect jury composition.
Despite potential overlap in ultimate effect, the policies do not operate,
and jurors are not “disadvantage[d,] . . . in the same fundamental
way.”189
In short, continuity in real-world operation and effect confirms
subject-matter continuity. To be sure, judgment is required at the
margins. But, as the mootness doctrine from which it borrows recognizes, flexible judgment calls are the price of a doctrine that responds
to real-world complexity. Understood that way, and once fleshed out,
substantial similarity is neither novel nor unduly manipulable. This
Article’s concept of taint requires this sort of continuity.
2. Continuity and Institutional Responsibility. — Another key is
the actor’s identity. The easiest cases, involving persistent individual
executive actors,190 do not exhaust the set. The problems of evasion
and lingering effects of past wrongdoing do not disappear simply
because multimember bodies have inconstant personnel.191 An institutional realist approach suggests that institutional continuity helps
explain how identity matters, as well as the nature of the responsibility
at T2. Taint recognizes responsibility as connected not just to individual decisionmakers but to the institutions of which they are a part.
Here, it helps to disentangle two concepts of responsibility —
The former
“blame responsibility” and “task responsibility.”192
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
187
188
189

Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also id. at 1417–18.
See Frampton, For Cause, supra note 107, at 786–88.
Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S.
656, 662 (1993). This is not to make this factor coextensive with mootness, but simply to draw on
judicial treatment of similarity in that context to illuminate this one.
190 See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2245–46, 2250–51 (2020); see also id. at 2234,
2236 (emphasizing the continuous presence of the lead prosecutor); id. at 2251 (Alito, J., concurring) (same).
191 In any event, the multi-actor composition of many “executives” makes them “theys” rather
than “its” on a realist approach. Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”:
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). And not even individual
persons are continuous over time, which could theoretically raise T1/T2 responsibility allocations
in the same way that multimember-body discontinuity does. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 16, at
1373 n.211.
192 See Stilz, supra note 143, at 194 & n.11. This approach to responsibility often surfaces in
nuanced moral philosophy debates over the concept of “moral taint.” See, e.g., Marina A. L.
Oshana, Moral Taint, 37 METAPHILOSOPHY 353, 359 (2006). This piece aligns with defenders of
some version of that concept insofar as they reject the claim that no one can be responsible (in any
sense) for actions over which they never exercised control. See, e.g., David Silver, Collective Re-
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recognizes responsibility in a sense that incorporates an actor’s “moral
fault or virtue.”193 In this classic sense, one is responsible because
one’s blameworthy behavior caused harm. Conversely, task responsibility concedes the actor’s moral innocence, yet nevertheless recognizes
some responsibility by virtue of some other nonblameworthy behavior
they have engaged in. For example, someone who voluntarily joins an
organization or group may have task responsibility for harms the organization causes irrespective of individual blame, just as they would
share the fruits of organizational success that they did not individually
cause.194
This distinction animates a realist approach. Assume arguendo
that formal policy separation and nonidentity (characteristic of the discriminatory predecessor fact pattern) preclude imputing identical
blame responsibility at T1 and T2. Nevertheless, even when political
decisionmakers have changed, new actors have opted into a going concern that has taken action, secured benefits, and incurred liabilities
tied to the institution, not its constituent individuals.195 Importantly,
this opting in granted T2 actors control over whether to hew to or
break from the T1 policy. That control, considered within the institution’s historical context (including T1), demonstrates institutional
continuity.
That continuity, in turn, reveals task responsibility associated with
any persistent, T1-rooted harms that T2 causes.196 Whatever might
have been the case absent reenactment, we can presume that a T2
reenactment was undertaken to carry forward some of T1’s perceived
benefits. Institutional embrace of the sweet of the past properly travels with limits on action based on responsibility for the bitter.
The fact of control also supports some assignment of blame based
on the T2 actors’ active choice to reaffirm T1’s operative core.
Consider, again, an analogy to conspiracy law, which sometimes holds
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
sponsibility, Corporate Responsibility and Moral Taint, 30 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 269, 271
(2006). That said, this Article is a legal intervention rooted in legal approaches to responsibility
and culpability. I draw on blame and task responsibility to provide a vocabulary for that intervention, not to endorse a particular side in that broader philosophical debate. It is beyond this
Article’s scope to take sides on, for example, the aptness of “shame” here. See Oshana, supra, at
373–74 (noting, additionally, other disagreements in the philosophy literature).
193 Stilz, supra note 143, at 195.
194 See id. at 194–95.
195 A supportive analogy is the classic justification for the potentially infinite transmission of
previously incurred debt “to successor governments and states” — “those who follow . . . enjoy . . .
the benefit of the credit that [was] extended to their predecessors.” Lee C. Buchheit et al., The
Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1210 (2007).
196 See, e.g., John M. Parrish, Collective Responsibility and the State, 1 INT’L THEORY 119,
127–28 (2009) (linking nonblame responsibility to “participation in a chain of social connections
that helps to create or sustain [a] negative outcome,” id. at 127).
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B responsible for blameworthy acts by A that B did not intend.197
That legal choice can be justified on the ground that B’s lessblameworthy intentional act of conspiring with A may be “added” to
B’s recklessness or negligence regarding the possibility that A might
engage in more-blameworthy acts in relation to the conspiracy.198 Similarly, here, we may grant that the T2 institutional decisionmakers are
less blameworthy than their predecessors. Yet we might still legitimately assign some blame responsibility based on the combination of
the less-blameworthy intentional reaffirmation and their negligence as
to the nature and continued effect of the T1 policy.
The key question, then, is whether the policy relationship reflects
the sort of institutional continuity that justifies recognizing past-rooted
responsibility. Taint requires the contemporary actors’ active participation in the institution that created T1, and specifically in the
reaffirmation of T1’s function.
This approach recognizes that it may be appropriate to constrain
institutions composed of multiple transitory individuals based on what
those individuals’ institutional predecessors did in the institution’s
name.199 That analysis captures turnover in multimember bodies.
Thus, we can still perceive institutional continuity in Ramos,
notwithstanding T1 and T2’s three-quarter-century separation. This
approach also recognizes personal continuity. Even though, like institutions, individuals change over time, common sense tells us that a
District Attorney’s continuous presence, as in Flowers, is germane. So,
too, we can find evidence of continuity where “a majority of the [same
party’s] legislators who voted for [the previous law] voted for [the new
law.]”200 But not everything germane is indispensable.
Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing the harder questions
this framing need not answer. T2 decisionmakers’ voluntary entry into, and action within, a particular organizational relation pretermits
the possibly harder (yet important) question of when we ought to
impute responsibility absent that level of volition.201 And because the
T1/T2 pattern includes some functional reenactment at T2, the account pretermits questions of whether some reparative responsibility
would attach even absent functional reaffirmation of T1 (and if so,
how much). That is to say, while plenty exists to argue about on this
account, it nevertheless presents a relatively easier case, especially giv–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197
198
199
200
201

Robinson, supra note 152, at 665–66.
Id. at 666.
See supra section II.A, pp. 1212–15.
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 31 (M.D.N.C. 2019).
Cf. Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Other Ordinary Persons, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071, 1078
(2021) (noting the possibility that “[o]ne generation can become complicit” in a past generation’s
wrongdoing).
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en the plausible synergy of blame and task responsibility in these fact
patterns.
In short, the origin story matters to a claim that the connection between T1 and T2 shapes T2’s validity. Part of that story includes
individuals, but when governmental responsibility is involved, the institution is a necessary part of that connective tissue. Continuitybased responsibility — in the sense that transcends individual
blameworthiness — thus properly requires a single institutional lineage. That lineage, in turn, helps justify tying current institutional and
policy responsibility to discriminatory policy predecessors. The justification embraces some imputation of responsibility to less responsible
actors who, for example, reaffirm a past problematic policy. But, importantly, taint also invokes the idea of never-terminated institutional
responsibility, revealed in institutional continuity.
3. Related Events. — Finally, given my emphasis on temporal
maximalism, it is worth considering how related events may inform
the taint determination.
Starting with intervening events, an expansive approach recognizes
that an event can reveal something important about the relationship
between events that it bisects. Here, specifically, an event that postdates and relates to an earlier event may help show the first event’s
connection to an event that postdates them both. Unsurprisingly, temporal
closeness
often
drives
public
law
responsibility
determinations.202
A representative example is litigation, or its threat, at “T1.5.”
Consider, on that note, a few instances in which the state’s T2 action
in relation to an intervening event creates evidence of a T1/T2
connection.
Most straightforward are what one might call postruling changes,
where the government shifts to a same-subject T2 after litigation generates an unfavorable ruling on the merits of a putative T1. In Trump,
the alterations to travel bans after losses in lower courts would fit this
bill. So too if the city in Palmer had lost and then in fact attempted to
reenact a pool-closure policy (perhaps closing some other public facilities to create a patina of difference).203 In both cases, it makes sense to
understand the final travel ban, or the new pool closure, differently
than if they had emerged absent litigation.
Changes pending a ruling illuminate for different reasons.
Governments routinely, while litigation is pending and sometimes be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
202 See, e.g., Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Title VII); Liaquat Ali
Khan, Temporality of Law, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 55, 72–74 (2009) (collecting examples).
203 Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (speculating about a reenactment for
“different reasons”).
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fore any merits ruling, announce a change in the challenged policy.204
They generally then assert mootness, and sometimes succeed.205 Even
if some of these cases are indeed moot, that need not sever continuity
for taint purposes. Mootness doctrine’s attention to similarity helps
confirm its usefulness for conceptualizing taint, but the two are not coextensive. It may be that changes both moot the case and sever any
degree of constitutionally relevant connection, but maybe not. For our
different purposes — locating continuity bearing on responsibility —
changes pending a ruling are powerful evidence.
Events entirely external to past or pending litigation can also inform a continuity determination. Think of demand letters, negative
press framing a practice as illegal, or a court ruling on materially similar facts. Such events raise a concrete, imminent threat of impending
litigation on an issue.206 If the jeopardized policy is amended or
“replaced” with a policy that functions similarly, the intervening event
of threatened litigation is a key piece of information binding the policies together. This discussion of litigation-related changes is not
exhaustive. What illuminates a particular relationship will depend on
the policies involved.
To be clear, related events are one factor. Without more, altering
policies in response to litigation is not inherently suspect, let alone necessarily fatal to the new policy. This factor must be understood in
connection with the focus on function. A new policy that functions in
a fundamentally different way is outside the scope of taint, regardless
of its relation to litigation. When a relation to litigation does exist,
however, we reasonably treat a policy differently if it also preserves the
earlier policy’s operative core. And, in close same-function cases, related events can properly tip the scales in taint’s favor. Finally, as Part
IV explains, like any tainted policy, a policy tainted under these circumstances can still be justified.
Related events can cut both ways. Expanding the scope of relevance beyond immediate temporal context may sweep in intervening
events that generate an anti-taint inference. Thus, it could sever continuity if an independent institution concluded for different, newly
arising reasons that the sort of policy at issue is beneficial and
nondiscriminatory.
Finally, I do not wish to discount the possibility that a preexisting
institutional tradition of pursuing a facially legitimate policy embodied
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
204 See, e.g., Joseph C. Davis & Nicholas R. Reaves, The Point Isn’t Moot: How Lower Courts
Have Blessed Government Abuse of the Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine, 129 YALE L.J.F. 325, 329–
32 (2019).
205 See id.
206 As spoliation doctrine recognizes. See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126–27
(2d Cir. 1998).
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in a T1/T2 relationship could weaken the negative inferences the relationship generates.207 Such a tradition could, in a sense, be thought of
as “good taint.” Still, when this tradition is genuinely preexisting, such
that the problematic T1 policy has the closest nexus to the modern policy, such a tradition should be unlikely to sever otherwise demonstrable continuity. This does not mean a preexisting salutary tradition
does not matter — as I discuss later, it bears on whether a government
can “purge” taint once detected.208
* * *
Summing up: Discriminatory predecessors raise questions about
whether and when responsibility for past government acts constrains
modern government behavior. We cannot answer those questions with
a view from nowhere. But we can answer them against the backdrop
of widespread legal recognition that continuity informs meaning and
responsibility, and in light of widely accepted antidiscrimination commitments. Those principles permit distinguishing legally relevant
predecessors of Louisiana’s modern nonunanimity rule (for example,
its initial 1898 enactment) from the legally irrelevant (the Louisiana
Purchase). Continuity in subject, effect, institution, and as inferred
from surrounding events intelligibly identifies when the relationship of
an earlier, wrongful policy and a successor embodies a taint.
Taint, defined this way, dictates no outcomes. The ability to
distinguish tainted progeny from an otherwise identical untainted policy helps justify distinctions in responsibility allocations. But circumstances and people change, governments should correct missteps, and
correction may well involve a policy with some resemblance to a discriminatory predecessor. Indeed, the idea of correction as a governmental responsibility undergirds this entire Part. Unfortunately,
changes can also represent faux correction that launders or insulates
past wrongdoing. Part IV’s elaboration of how to treat taint aims, in
part, to help distinguish faux and legitimate correction. The point so
far is that an antecedent task is distinguishing the tainted from the
untainted.
This Part began by observing that the alternatively minimalist and
maximalist judicial approaches to the discriminatory predecessor problem surface an old tension between institutional formalism and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
207 This idea draws on Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Trevor Morrison’s defense of
increased deference to the government where a challenged policy is “facially within the bounds of
long-settled authority,” Samuel Issacharoff & Trevor Morrison, Constitution by Convention, 108
CALIF. L. REV. 1913, 1941 (2020), and reflects “systematic practices that have defined” government operation “over a prolonged period of time,” id. at 1920.
208 See infra section IV.B, pp. 1238–45.
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realism. This proposal attempts to attend to both perspectives’ valid
concerns, settling closer to the realist pole. The standard thus has
some play in the joints. Still, contra usual concerns about realism devolving into arbitrary free-for-alls,209 realist pursuit of legally relevant
continuity can be rigorous. We need not have finally resolved whether
formalism or realism is better to believe that in particular settings a
realist approach best responds to the current problems.210
It is possible to achieve a better concept of constitutional continuity
for antidiscrimination law. The taint concept offers part of the solution. And though taint is not the final word, understanding what it is
will help guide our thinking about what it looks like to purge it.
III. TAINT AS TRIGGER AND WRONGFUL DISCRIMINATION
Part I explained that muddled approaches to the discriminatory
predecessor problem highlight the need for a framework that advances
how we treat these instances. Part II offered the first piece of that solution by sketching a temporally maximalist, institutionally realist approach to detecting meaningful policy similarity across time. When
detected, we can call that relationship “taint.” But staging the analysis
this way isolates the next questions: What is taint? And what are its
implications?
This Part begins to answer those questions by explaining what kind
of concept taint is, and what effects that concept entails. Taint is a relational fact that can, all else equal, be evidence of T2 pretext. But it
is far more significant in its role as a constitutional concept that triggers a specific method of detecting the violation of constitutional antidiscrimination principles.
As such, it intervenes in broader
conversations about the meaning, and detection, of wrongful discrimination. Finally, this Part’s conceptual work lays the foundation for
Part IV’s prescription for taint’s practical operation.
A. Beyond Pretext
Before defending my more ambitious vision of taint, I want to start
with what I hope will be common ground on its utility. Some policy is
pretextual.211 That recognition often animates judicial approaches.212
All else equal, and especially in compressed cases, taint raises the likelihood that a facially neutral T2 is in fact a bad faith attempt to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
209 Cf. Pildes, supra note 23, at 8–9, 39 (noting “predictable rule-of-law questions,” id. at 39,
associated with realism).
210 See id. at 53–54.
211 See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 9, 20 (1997) (defining pretext and connecting it to intentionality).
212 See Denning & Kent, supra note 161, at 1780–84.
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launder an illegitimate T1. The concept is thus a quintessential antievasion tool,213 and it is therefore independently useful to any search
for conscious malintent in a world where such intent can be subtle and
cloaked behind policy change over time.
Limiting taint’s role to smoking out specific bad intent, however,
would raise some reasonable critiques, such as the fear of false
positives. Surely some cases of descriptive taint will in fact not stem
from specific present-day proscribed intent. And the strength of an inference of bad specific intent likely decays over time. This limitation
would also be vulnerable to the long-running ontological and epistemic
critiques of talking about bad intent in a world of multimember bodies
and nonobservable mental states.214
To be sure, pessimists regarding our society’s expungement of
present-day bad intent may deem a flood of false positives unlikely.
And concerns about intent’s artificiality have not deterred courts or
the person on the street from invoking intent as a useful concept.215
But these critiques offer some reason to go beyond pretext. That is,
taint justifies a decision rule that does not require specific proscribed
intent. This is the more controversial claim, but our descriptive
foundation can lend it some support.
B. Constitutional Decision Rules and Wrongful Discrimination
The broader understanding of taint is best characterized as a trigger for a targeted antidiscrimination “decision rule.”216 Under this
rubric, borrowed from Professor Mitchell Berman, the distinction is
between rules that define the “proper meaning” of a constitutional
provision and rules that define “how to decide whether” a provision
has been complied with.217
Applying this distinction helps show what taint is not. It is not, for
example, an independent constitutional violation. Nor is it a conclusive demonstration of such a violation. Nor does it depend on the particular content of the underlying violation that it may help show
(which is why it can work as a transsubstantive concept). Rather,
taint is shorthand for a type of intertemporal continuity that warrants
thinking differently about whether and why we should assign constitutional responsibility at T2. That different way of thinking is a

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213
214
215

See id. at 1776.
See Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 203–04; Landau, supra note 1, at 2156–57.
See W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173,
212 (2021).
216 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).
217 Id.
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taint-specific method for determining whether a constitutional antidiscrimination provision has been violated.218
The remainder of this Part fills out the decision rule’s content.
Specifically, it argues that the rule is best thought of as an objective
one that rejects any need, at T2, for specific intent to harm or
otherwise act unconstitutionally.
Understanding the scope of this intervention requires situating
taint within longer-running debates over how the law detects proscribed discrimination.219 Those debates stem from the reality that at
least any nonuniversal government action (and some universal ones)
“discriminate” in the sense that they draw distinctions or create disparate effects among people.220 We thus need a way to identify which
of those distinctions are “wrongful discrimination” and which are
not.221 For present purposes, the contestants fall into two camps,
although considerable nuance exists within them.
One perspective treats something akin to specific intent (either to
harm or to classify in some inherently wrongful way) as a necessary
prerequisite to showing wrongful discrimination.222 It is theoretically
possible to apply this approach to collective bodies.223 But, because no
mental state (individual or collective) is directly observable, this approach can devolve into a search for smoking guns like outlandish
avowals of racism or a disparate effect explainable only by specific
intent.224
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218 See id. at 9–10; Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes
What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1657–58 (2005).
219 See generally EIDELSON, supra note 24; HELLMAN, supra note 24; Lawrence, supra note
25; Strauss, supra note 26. See also Frank I. Michelman, Reasonable Umbrage: Race and
Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South Africa, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1378, 1383 n.30 (2004).
220 HELLMAN, supra note 24, at 13–14, 27; see Gowder, supra note 20, at 1030–31 (suggesting
that all legislative acts are nonuniversal in the sense that “they indicate conditions for the application of law,” id. at 1031, that will not always be met).
221 See, e.g., Gowder, supra note 20, at 1049–50.
222 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 62, at 1419–21; Siegel, supra note 25, at 1279. But see infra
section III.C, pp. 1232–34. A lurking complexity stems from the modern Court’s tendency to treat
the mere use of race as a constitutional problem requiring justification, even absent any
alleged intent to harm. See, e.g., Haney-López, supra note 25, at 1781–89. That approach does
not obviously flow from doctrinal formulations focused on purposeful adverse effects. E.g., Pers.
Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Elaborating whether, and how, that colorblindness
approach can be reconciled with cases like Feeney is beyond this Article’s scope. For present
purposes, it suffices to note that the Court’s approach in such cases evinces an already existing
judicial ability to understand flexibly wrongful discrimination’s relation to intent.
223 See Fallon, supra note 24, at 537–38 (advancing a coherent concept of collective legislative
intent, but noting its difficulties in the area of “forbidden” intent).
224 Classic examples of such effects, although preceding modern equal protection doctrine,
include Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960); and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
374 (1886).
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The primary alternative contains multitudes, all of which consider
the specific-intent vision inadequate, and all of which (generally) look
to effects to guide the decision rule.225 Some alternatives are framed
primarily by their advocates as offering an alternative vision of the
underlying constitutional meaning.
No surprise; the distinction
between decision rules and the underlying “operative propositions” can
be murky.226 Even if these alternatives speak more in the register of
constitutional meaning, they all need a theory of the appropriate decision rule that excludes reference to specific intent.
So, for example, for some the essential problem is “selective
indifference”227 to burdens or harms to one group that the state would
not permit for a socially preferred group.228 Specific intent is unnecessary, although this framing would seem to require some alternativehistory speculation to conclude that a harm-generating decision would
have been made otherwise if the harm fell on another (in practice, the
dominant) group.229
Another view focuses on ascertaining demeaning social meaning.230
Here again, the focus is not on intent, but on whether the act
“expresses the appropriate valuations of (that is, attitudes toward) persons.”231 This approach needs a decision rule for determining the reasonable and conventional understanding of the action.232 The possibility of contesting an action’s expressive character, rooted in social
context, can pose a problem for this view.233
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
225
226

See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 26, at 941–45.
Berman, supra note 216, at 79–89; Roosevelt, supra note 218, at 1655; see also Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term — Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1975) (exploring the “differences of degree,” id. at 33, involved in similar attempted distinctions).
227 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term — Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1976) (“racially selective sympathy and
indifference,” id. at 7); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 263–64 (1991); Lawrence, supra note 25, at 347–49; Strauss, supra note 26, at
1007.
228 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 25, at 348–49 (envisioning decisionmakers who, unconsciously, “would have weighed the costs and benefits differently” if the harm had fallen on White people, id. at 348, and decisionmakers who never thought about race one way or the other and
nevertheless “inadvertent[ly] devalu[ed]” Black persons’ interests, id. at 349); Strauss, supra note
26, at 1007 (contemplating “legislators . . . free of conscious discrimination” who “may nevertheless
be better able to sympathize with the suffering of members of their own race than with the plight
of [another racial] group”).
229 See Klarman, supra note 227, at 298–99.
230 See EIDELSON, supra note 24, at 6–9; see also HELLMAN, supra note 24, at 29, 33.
231 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000).
232 See id. at 1512–13; EIDELSON, supra note 24, at 7; Gowder, supra note 20, at 1036,
1043–44.
233 See HELLMAN, supra note 24, at 33, 74; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 231, at 1570.
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Another view that rejects intent might be dubbed “unintentional
pretext.”234 Consider that some decisionmakers who genuinely believe
they are acting for legitimate reasons may have unconsciously engaged
in motivated reasoning or self-deception.235 Such behavior differs
from classic pretext insofar as decisionmakers mislead not just others
but themselves.
These approaches may overlap. For example, selective-indifference
evidence could include what the action and its effects communicate.
They are also not coextensive.
The selective-indifference and
expressive-meaning approaches might reach cases where the actor’s
mind is more empty than deluded (contra “unintentional pretext”).
And one might imagine an action impugned by its social meaning even
without sufficient evidence that decisionmakers would have acted differently had the burden fallen on a dominant group.
More importantly, these approaches unite in rejecting conscious intent as the essential quality of constitutionally proscribed
discrimination and in needing a decision rule focused on objective
facts about the world.236
* * *
To sum up: One could hinge constitutional antidiscrimination decision rules on specific, subjective, discriminatory intent. Even if one
acknowledges that such intent must be inferred, when facially neutral
policies are at issue, this worldview pushes toward invalidating only
those policies impeached by smoking guns.237 Alternately, we might
recognize the relevance of subjectivity but emphasize that wrongfulness need not depend on it.238
Taint can intervene in this old debate. Recall that none of Part II’s
indicia of legal continuity require specific intent at T2 (although, as
section A notes, they may be relevant to pretext). The ability to
describe taint this way supports understanding the decision rule it
generates as not requiring specific intent.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
234
235

Cf. Charlow, supra note 211, at 20 (noting intentionality of conventional pretext).
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term — Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19–26
(2011); Pozen, supra note 26, at 934–36.
236 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961); Anderson & Pildes,
supra note 231, at 1523–24; Pozen, supra note 26, at 934–35; Strauss, supra note 26, at 946, 961–
62. They thus track judicial interpretation of the First and Fourth Amendments. See, e.g.,
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (First); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (Fourth).
237 See Haney-López, supra note 25, at 1790, 1837–39 (discussing inferences of government
“innocence” from benign context).
238 See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 17, at 517.
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C. Against Specific Intent
To reiterate, taint can be useful even understood narrowly as a
mere auxiliary of an inquiry into specific intent. But the descriptive
account can justify a broader view — one that dovetails with the
just-discussed alternative approaches to demonstrating wrongful
discrimination.
Begin with some truths about any wrongful T1.239 Any T1 had
some actual effect in the world. Here, I mean any effect, not just
disparate effect on the basis of some trait. For example, some would
cast Palmer as an example of evil intent without disparate racial effect,
because the city’s public-pool closure made such pools unavailable to
everyone.240 Even if one says the closures had no disparate racial
effect (which I do not), denying public pools to everyone is a cognizable real-world “effect.”241
Recognizing that T1 did something in the real world supports the
next point. The descriptive framework offers a vocabulary for
describing when an intertemporal policy connection matters more for
meaning and responsibility than for the mine-run relationship between
two policies. Thus it looks to continuity in function, real-world effect,
and institutional actor, as well as inquiring into whether any related
events inform that connection.242 That approach provides both a
factual basis and a reason for concluding that T1 ought to inform T2
responsibility determinations, much the same way that, for example,
continuity between corporations is a reason for concluding that the
earlier corporation’s criminal liability ought to pass to the later.243
And it can do so without ever requiring reference to T2 “intent.”
This conclusion is not compelled. Saying that taint “can” support a
view is not to say that it must. That said, consider the key facts of the
relevant situation. A T1 policy, with real-world effects, constituted
wrongful discrimination. Now, at T2, we have a policy connected in a
uniquely close way to that earlier policy, including in its real-world
function. We must determine whether the second-in-time policy
complies with constitutional antidiscrimination mandates. Should the
descriptive fact of taint matter to the decision rule, and if so, how
much?
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
239 I consider the import of the government possibly disputing the T1 policy’s wrongfulness in
section V.A.2, pp. 1261–64.
240 See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 227, at 296 (noting that “[the closure’s] impact seemed
nondiscriminatory”).
241 I am not sure exactly what a genuine bad-intent-with-zero-effect case looks like, but it is
outside this Article’s scope.
242 See supra section II.D, pp. 1218–27.
243 See Diamantis, supra note 148, at 4; see also supra section II.A, pp. 1212–15 (outlining examples of continuity-connected responsibility).
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It is not incoherent to say that taint matters merely as evidence of
specific proscribed intent, such that the mere passage of time would
render it progressively irrelevant. In my view, however, the principles
shaping the descriptive account reveal why the better decision rule
cannot be reduced to motivation. It cannot, for the same reasons that
district courts must go beyond enjoining illegal activity to eradicating
the past’s discriminatory effects, and that state actors have a compelling interest in remedying the effects of past public or private discrimination.244 In short, past harm can extend into the present in judicially
cognizable ways, and the state can and should address the past’s problematic persistence. Those principles animate taint, and a decision
rule focused on T2 bad intent gives them short shrift.
Taint, in other words, cuts through arguments over the general
value of a specific-intent decision rule. Whatever might be said for or
against such a rule generally, it is particularly inapt here if one buys
the descriptive account of taint.245 To be sure, this proposal steps beyond a judicial decree eradicating the discriminatory effects of the
specific activity enjoined. But the step is small. And treating a specifically identified relationship with a discriminatory predecessor as relevant, irrespective of T2 subjective intent, is consistent with the
compelling-interest status of remedying the effects of discrimination.
Slippery-slope critiques of the supposedly unbounded results of recognizing amorphous “societal discrimination” are thus off point here.246
The foregoing points reveal taint’s intervention within broader debates over motive in antidiscrimination law. Where taint exists, the
specific-intent framework lacks the vocabulary to describe fully what
matters. Here, it is unusually easy to see what the broader view’s
advocates generally maintain: our evaluative judgments of people and
our evaluative judgments of their actions can be treated independently.247 Importantly, in triggering a more expansive decision rule, taint
need not embrace conclusively any particular broader locution of the
underlying constitutional problem. In every case, taint fits comfortably into a view that focuses on what the government act effects rather
than what the government actors intended.
For example, taint is probative of selective indifference because we
know that a past, substantially similar constellation of facts did in fact
constitute wrongful discrimination. That may not be conclusive, as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
244
245

See supra section II.B, pp. 1216–17.
This is not to deny specific bad intent’s relevance. It is simply to insist that tainted situations demonstrate specific intent’s failure, without more, to provide a satisfactory, comprehensive
account of wrongful discrimination. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 26, at 962.
246 See, e.g., Boddie, supra note 16, at 1279–81 (citing, inter alia, the slippery-slope
argument in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
247 Gowder, supra note 20, at 1050.
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Part IV emphasizes. But, on the selective-indifference view, we would
want all information relevant to indifference, and taint provides important information even absent pretext. Indeed, taint helps regiment
the selective-indifference approach by reducing the need for hard-toknow historical counterfactuals.248
Taint also fits well into approaches focused on expressive or social
meaning. If the question is how we should interpret a particular set of
facts pertaining to a government act, a history of this institution
wielding this sort of act wrongfully is important, regardless of modern
intent. Again, taint can reduce the need for speculation (here, about
the action’s social meaning).249
Finally, recognizing taint helps reveal likely cases of unintentional
pretext. After all, in a world without truth serum, speculating about
what someone would “really think if they were honest with
themselves” can be a dangerous game. But a rigorously identified
tainted relationship gives us purchase — an objective reason to suspect
that someone might in fact be engaged in genuinely successful
self-deception.
D. The Taint Trigger and Doctrine
A few words are warranted on doctrinal fit. To be clear, if necessary, taint should be understood as a uniquely justified exception to the
normally obtaining decision rules in antidiscrimination cases. One can
make a case for its compatibility, however.
As noted, it is generally said that the Court’s discriminatory
purpose doctrine makes conscious intent to harm necessary for an
The most restrictive language
equal protection violation.250
comes from Personnel Administrator v. Feeney251: “‘Discriminatory
purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences”; it “implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”252 One might read that case and its progeny as imposing a
conscious-intent requirement inconsistent with taint’s broadest
deployment.
On the other hand, Feeney did not present as groundbreaking. It
focused primarily on explaining that the then-recently created intent
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
248
249
250

See Strauss, supra note 26, at 972–73.
See Gowder, supra note 20, at 1039–40 (noting this common critique).
See, e.g., Haney-López, supra note 25, at 1783, 1795–96; Klarman, supra note 227, at 298;
Siegel, supra note 25, at 1279.
251 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
252 Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
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framework distinguished “because of” from “in spite of.”253 That is,
some harms to identifiable groups that we might colloquially say were
“intended” (because foreseeable) are not “intentional” for equal
protection purposes because they occurred, in truth, “in spite of” the
group’s identity.254 But that oft-criticized distinction does not resolve
for all purposes the proper decision rule for divining “because of.”255
Feeney’s take on the matter seems entirely in line with its predecessor,
Washington v. Davis,256 in recognizing that “[p]roof of discriminatory
intent” may “rely on objective factors,” legitimately determined “from
the results” achieved or avoided.257
Because “discriminatory purpose” must be determined on the basis
of objective facts in the world rather than (impossible) direct observation of often-nonexistent mental states (such as of multimember bodies),258 it is consistent with reading “because of” in a way that does not
demand a specific-intent decision rule. That is, it remains possible to
say that some cases that do not reflect heartland specific-intent cases
are also not best described as harm merely inflicted “in spite of” group
identity.
Taint can fit into this class of cases. Consider the selectiveindifference approach. If, due to selective indifference, a decisionmaker adopts a policy it would not have adopted had the burdens fallen on
a more-favored group, one can intelligibly say the adoption was
“because” the burdens in fact fell on a less favored group. We may
understand unpurged taint as at least demonstrating selective indifference to the harms of perpetuating a tainted law and the responsibility
generated by discriminatory predecessors. If so, one can, consistently
with Feeney, treat such a policy as constituting a violation.259
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
253 Id.; see also id. at 278 (“The appellee’s ultimate argument rests upon the presumption . . .
that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions.”); Katie
Eyer, The But-For Theory of Anti-discrimination Law, 107 VA. L. REV. 1621, 1632–33 (2021) (arguing, similarly, that the “only aim” of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and its progeny
“was to reject a pure disparate impact standard,” Eyer, supra, at 1633, and that the cases left inchoate the Court’s conception of “discriminatory purpose”).
254 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. But see id. at 279 n.25 (recognizing that in some circumstances
foreseeability is strong evidence of proscribed purpose).
255 Cf. John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397,
2431 (2017) (noting that what we deem a government actor’s “intended decision” must proceed
from a “value judgment about what should count as that . . . decision”).
256 426 U.S. 229.
257 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.24; see also id. at 279 & n.25; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
242; id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
258 See Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1123 (2018)
(“[A]ll internal mental states must be proven by recourse to external circumstances . . . .”).
259 Cf. Strauss, supra note 26, at 962 & n.80 (contending that Feeney is more capacious than
often suggested, and that it permits a “reversing the groups” approach to “discriminatory intent”
that would embrace selective-indifference principles).
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At the very least, advocates and lower courts need not read governing Supreme Court doctrine to preclude a specific intent–exempt
decision rule in taint cases. Finally, if this reading does not resonate
descriptively, I also mean it normatively. That is, if Supreme Court
doctrine really does preclude the decision rule I advocate (and
elaborate further in Part IV), taint’s existence is yet another strike
against that doctrine’s persuasiveness.
IV. OPERATIONALIZING TAINT
Part III advocated understanding taint as a trigger for a specialized
decision rule that (at minimum) justifies denying a tainted policy
“clean-slate” treatment, irrespective of intent or facial validity. This
Part drills down further on how that decision rule would work, including what follows from the rule and what it would mean to say taint
has been purged. Readers still committed to specific intent should
read on; as noted, taint can aid in all cases as a tool for detecting pretext. More broadly, one can adhere to a decision rule that embraces
specific intent and believe that taint justifies imputation of whatever
degree of intent one thinks necessary. Ample precedent exists for that
perspective; criminal law often recognizes the propriety of imputing
mental states.260
A definitional note: I treat “purged” as shorthand for the conclusion
that the relationship described in Part II ought not to count against the
modern policy. In other words, the framework outlined in this Part
bears on two related but distinct questions: (1) what the government
must do to defend a T2 policy on the grounds that taint should not
weigh against its validity and (2) what the government might be able
to do at “T3” to enact a similar policy if it cannot validate its T2
policy.
This Part begins by advocating a judicial approach focused on disparate impact and reason-giving. First, given a showing of taint,
courts should ask whether a T2 policy continues to carry a
non–de minimis disparate impact of the sort T1 imposed. A government can purge otherwise applicable taint by showing the absence of
such impact. Second, if disparate impact persists, governments must
offer a more substantial justification than a facially neutral act normally requires. The taint shapes what that justification looks like; the
reasoning must specifically engage with the import of the tainted
relationship for the present policy, including an explanation of why
disparate impact can’t be eliminated and why this policy’s necessity
outweighs its tainted impact.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
260 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 152, at 614–19 (outlining a “diverse group of doctrines,” id. at
615, governing imputation of culpable mental states).
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This approach fills out the decision rule further. A tainted relationship is prima facie evidence that justifies shifting a burden of production to the government of demonstrating the taint’s extirpation. Although the ultimate burden of proof never shifts, it counts in the
plaintiff’s favor on the ultimate question if the government cannot
purge the taint by showing no disparate impact or a substantial, taintsensitive showing of necessity.
Taint represents a setting in which receding from judicial disparate
impact skepticism is unusually justified. At the same time, this approach aims to show the workability of good faith purging. Eliminating real-world disparate effects suggests dissipation of the primary
wrong, which I take to be disparate status–based harm. Absent that,
because taint can exist absent present-day bad intentions, the government’s burden is not to show that it really has good intentions, but to
show why the policy is nevertheless necessary. After explaining the
approach, I test its usefulness on some real-world cases and discuss
some potential implementation difficulties.
I close this Part by emphasizing that taint is a constitutional concept that is portable to nonjudicial contexts. Understanding it this
way highlights that taint is not just a tool of (sometimes justified) judicial overriding of democratic will. It can also be a mechanism that
empowers democratic actors committed to understanding and enforcing their constitutional duties.
A. Reinvigorating Disparate Impact
As a theory, disparate impact has generated endless debates over its
meaning, justifications, and implications. One particularly relevant
justification is its usefulness in eradicating the continuing effects of
past discrimination.261 Although Washington v. Davis refused to give
disparate impact constitutional dimension,262 lower courts had previously permitted disparate impact to establish liability, at least
presumptively.263 Taint justifies a recovery of some form of this
approach.
Recall first that we can know that a policy is tainted without
necessarily knowing whether it has a disparate impact.264 Thus, find–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
261 See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 25, at 1088 & n.73; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1604–05 (2019).
262 426 U.S. at 248.
263 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Foreword: Equality Divided,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2013); Strauss, supra note 26, at 950–51.
264 To be sure, the benefits and burdens of the T2 policy vis-à-vis the T1 policy are key to
determining whether the policies are functional duplicates for purposes of taint. See supra section
III.C, pp. 1232–34. But, at that initial taint-detection stage, what matters is whether the T2 law
tracks the T1 law by (for example) making it harder to vote by imposing a voter ID requirement.
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ing taint leaves open the question of whether the T2 rule creates any
non–de minimis disparate impact on an identifiable group.265
Governments can purge taint by showing the absence of meaningful
disparate impact.266 Though this is an escape hatch, it is not easily
manipulated.
On one hand, a disparate impact–focused path to purging addresses
the fear that taint will forever straitjacket governments, notwithstanding genuine changes in circumstances.267 That concern has some
validity, regardless of one’s optimism regarding the speed of progress.
At least when a policy tainted in form is no longer discriminatory in
effect, it is appropriate to consider the policy on its own terms.
At the same time, governments cannot escape by simply manipulating the policy’s form or waiting for the passage of time to dissipate the
taint. With respect to pretext, bad faith actors who simply wish to
launder malice will have a harder time if they must simultaneously expunge any disparate impact. Focusing on disparate impact also
advances approaches that decenter specific intent to harm. Eliminating disparate impact is strong evidence of equal treatment today, notwithstanding the past’s meaning.
B. Reason-Based Purging

1. Why Permit Reason-Giving? — In some cases, disparate impact
will persist. In others, such as when the T2 is new, determining
whether it will persist may require undue speculation about downstream effects.268 One could simply treat those cases as the end of the
line, such that taint plus governmental inability to dispel disparate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
If taint exists, this Article then looks to any disparate burden to inform the possibility of purging
taint.
265 I am not wedded to a single definition of de minimis. One venerable standard asks whether
the rate for the identifiable group “is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the
highest rate.” Greene, supra note 25, at 45; see also Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test
for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2009) (advocating synthesis of fourfifths and “statistical significance” approaches to defining non–de minimis disparate impact).
See generally Stephanopoulos, supra note 261. At minimum an actionable impact should be both
“statistically” and “practically” significant. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct.
2321, 2358 n.4 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 261, at 1571–72.
266 In this way, I deviate from the mine-run statutory disparate impact framework, in which
the plaintiff has the burden of showing a disparity. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 261, at 1595.
I think this makes better sense of taint’s fit with antidiscrimination law, since the alternative
would de facto make the passage of time presumptively purge taint, which would let the state off
the hook more easily than I think is warranted.
267 Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 230 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing
fear of indefinite “lock[] in”); Clarke, supra note 17, at 561–63.
268 Sometimes a new policy’s changes will be sufficiently straightforward to permit informed,
reliable speculation about its effects, cf. Stephanopoulos, supra note 261, at 1640–41 & n.421, so I
cannot rule out the possibility of drawing predictive disparate impact conclusions.
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impact equals conclusive determination of wrongful discrimination.
That is a coherent suggestion, but it goes too far.
As an initial matter, permitting the government to show why this
disparate impact is justified and unavoidable would be consistent with
the general approach to disparate impact in other areas.269 Symmetry
alone does not resolve matters, since taint could be a unique beast.
But the general approach is worth noting, especially if good reasons
exist for it. Moreover, and again, taint is a heuristic helpful in determining wrongful discrimination, not the determination itself. Prima
facie cases are rebuttable,270 and I doubt that showing a lack of disparate impact should be the only way to rebut this one. Although
taint helps show why a broader decision rule is preferable, it does not
follow that governments should lose whenever they cannot disprove
persistent disparate impact.
Consider cases where we simply cannot know T2’s impact. Not
every case will be like Trump v. Hawaii, where the question reduces to
whether permissible or forbidden reasons explain an indisputable disparate impact. Treating such situations as automatic government
losses would be simplistic. A tainted policy might well, under presentday
circumstances,
be
both
supportable
by
legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons and also indispensable for tackling a given
policy problem. Especially given taint’s decoupling from intent, uncertainty about impact should not work to lock governments into the status quo indefinitely. Perhaps the government can show that what
seems to be (for example) selectively indifferent or demeaning action
actually is not.
Even where disparate impact can be foreseen or has already occurred, an absolutist approach may be unwarranted. Some necessary
policies may have an unavoidable disparate impact that compelling
justifications outweigh. For example, some might critique any government benefit not pegged to recipient need as generating a disparate
impact because of preexisting entrenched disparate distributions of
power and resources.271 Sometimes rejecting progressivity may be
illegitimate precisely because it will produce such impacts, even if it
lifts all boats overall.272 But sometimes it may not. Imagine a public
good that by its nature “cannot be provided to anybody unless [it is]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
269
270

See id. at 1595, 1597–98, 1604.
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1971) (discussing burden shifting in the prima
facie context).
271 See, e.g., Kevin E. Jason, Dismantling the Pillars of White Supremacy: Obstacles in
Eliminating Disparities and Achieving Racial Justice, 23 CUNY L. REV. 139, 151 (2020) (describing “colorblind benefits” as, inter alia, “includ[ing policy] solutions that involve the sometimes
equal, but always inequitable [i.e., unjust], allocation of resources and opportunities” and noting
that “one’s starting position is critical to determining how one will fare”).
272 See id. at 151–52, 159, 180.
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provided to everybody” on the same terms.273 Especially for substantial interests,274 it is a harder question whether the disparate impact of
providing it might be justified because of the difficulty of making it
progressive and the substantive importance of the benefits.
2. Reason-Based Purging. — Given those preliminaries, what sort
of reasons might purge taint where disparate impact persists or cannot
be disproven? Tiers-of-scrutiny talk can sometimes obscure.275 But
the tiers may help illuminate inappropriate approaches.
Consider the application of strict scrutiny to facially neutral policies found to be animated at least in part by discriminatory purpose.276
Taint can exist absent that showing. Requiring the T2 government to
satisfy strict scrutiny based on nothing more than taint would transform it into the underlying violation that it aids in demonstrating. Yet
the highly deferential rational basis review usually applicable to
facially neutral government acts is too lax. Taint with teeth must excuse plaintiffs from disproving “every conceivable basis which might
support [the policy],”277 and deny governments the boon of having
policies upheld on reasons articulated for the first time in litigation or
conceived independently by the courts.278
Something intermediate is needed to fill out the decision rule applicable when governments cannot purge taint via eliminating disparate
impact. Helpfully, antidiscrimination law has a conventional framework for dealing with disparate impact.279 On that approach, given
disparate impact, a defendant must show that the challenged “practice
is necessary to achieve a substantial interest,” and, if so, the plaintiff
“may try to demonstrate that this interest could be attained through
different means that yield smaller [disparities].”280 The taint approach
need not duplicate the usual approach, which itself varies somewhat
depending on context.281 Thus, for example, I reverse the “usual
framework” by placing the burden on the government to show no
disparate impact.282 Still, reinventing the wheel is unnecessary.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
273 LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 46 (2002).
274 Consider, for example, national defense or certain anti–air pollution measures.
275 See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and
the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2340 (2006).
276 See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS ET AL., RACIAL JUSTICE AND LAW 410 (1st ed. 2016).
277 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019) (quoting
Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 685 (2012)).
278 BREST ET AL., supra note 25, at 567.
279 Stephanopoulos, supra note 261, at 1595.
280 Id.
281 See, e.g., id. at 1600 n.190 (noting deviations in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
framework).
282 See supra note 266.

2022]

DISCRIMINATORY TAINT

1241

In crafting the best approach for a taint-specific rule, then, I draw
on the usual framework’s insight that otherwise-suspect disparities
may be justified upon a heightened showing.
Furthermore, although the approach is not importable wholesale, I
see much value in administrative law’s reasoned-decisionmaking approach.283 Formally, it requires that a decision be “based on a consideration of the relevant factors.”284 Importantly, courts “may not
supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself
has not given.”285 Here, “meaningful judicial review” requires an agency
to “disclose the basis” of its action,286 and actions may be invalid where
there is a “significant mismatch between the decision . . . made and the
rationale . . . provided.”287
Disputes over how rigorous this review is in practice need not be
resolved here.288 I invoke the standard to embrace the idea of legitimacy that appears to support it — that democratic legitimacy flows
from the capacity and ability to provide “public-regarding reasons that
all might accept.”289 If the state is to require citizens to live under a
law whose form was tainted and that continues to impose disparate
impacts, the state ought to be able to offer robust explanations,
applicable to all, for why it is necessary.
3. Filling Out the Approach. — Building on these raw materials,
purgative reason-giving must reflect robust engagement with the tainted relationship. Persistent disparate impact does not necessarily doom
the policy. But, to purge the taint, governments must offer (1) a legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest that will be substantially impaired
absent this policy, (2) direct engagement with the past problematic
history, (3) an explanation of why the disparate impact cannot be eliminated, and (4) an explanation of why the legitimate need for this
means of pursuing the legitimate interest outweighs the harm of
shielding the disparate impact of a tainted rule. These reasons cannot
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
283 Professor David Super has also noted the potential relevance of administrative law principles to evaluating policy change over time, although he deploys them differently. See Super, supra
note 16, at 84–87.
284 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020)
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
285 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citing
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
286 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
287 Id. at 2575.
288 See, e.g., Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1355, 1356, 1358–59 (2016) (arguing that administrative lawyers and academics overestimate the
toughness of reasoned-decisionmaking review).
289 JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
168 (2018) (arguing that administrative law principles implement this vision of legitimacy); see
also Thomas P. Schmidt, Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts, 108 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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be post hoc, and a court may not conjure them up on the
government’s behalf.
Much of this approach will depend on context-specific “qualitative
judgments” made “in light of competing values and social facts,”290
and I will apply it to specific cases in section C. Here, I will simply
say a bit about the types of social facts that will matter and why.
For example, courts should care about the passage of time and
changed personnel, not because those necessarily purge taint, but
because time’s passage generates new problems, and new decisionmakers identify new solutions. These facts matter, in short, because they
make
it
more
plausible
that
a
substantial,
novel
government need has emerged to independently justify the policy. I do
not mean to suggest that an unprecedented need is necessary, but its
existence would be a strong sign that the animating aims truly have
changed.
Balancing the need against the persistent harm will also be multifaceted. Much will turn on whether the legitimate need for this policy
in this form outweighs the specific harm of the tainted rule’s
preservation. In advocating the disinterring and protection of a right
against a tainted rule’s disparate impact, this approach can be seen as
a species of the proportionality approach that Professor Jamal Greene
advances as a general approach to rights questions.291 Again, I will
sketch a few examples.
Return to plausible alternatives for pursuing the asserted governmental interest. Could a state purge a felon disenfranchisement law’s
taint by merely invoking “deterrence” as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason? No, because the burden is not just to show that a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification can be articulated, but that
a legitimate interest has generated a genuine nondiscriminatory need
for this policy in this form. Deterrence is too general, because felonies
can be deterred without such a law. Deterrence might well be somewhat impaired from the state’s perspective, but taking taint seriously
means that policy-choice freedom is somewhat constrained. Practically, then, the legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest will have to be stated with meaningful precision; otherwise, a plausible alternative will be
relatively easy to identify and will militate against a claim of necessity.
Continuing in this vein, plausible alternatives to pursuing the
asserted interest will also undermine a claim that disparate impact
can’t be eliminated. As the felon disenfranchisement example suggests, the purgative analysis incorporates “tailoring” elements.
Importantly, though, this is not to say that plausible alternatives are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
290
291

Greene, supra note 25, at 61.
See id. at 58–60.
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fatal to an attempt to purge taint. This is not a strict scrutiny analysis.
A state could conceivably show that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interest would be substantially impaired without policy X without
showing that policy X is the only way of pursuing the interest. But
plausible alternatives do suggest that a substantial impairment claim
may be unwarranted.
On the other side, the state can bolster a necessity claim by identifying “good taint,” that is, a long tradition of nonsuspect institutional
uses of this sort of policy for this interest.292 An institutional history of
legitimate needs generating functionally similar conduct is itself a reason to believe the government if it claims, today, that legitimate, nondiscriminatory needs exist for the policy.
Regarding the strength of the interest pursued, although governments need not identify an interest that a court would call compelling,
it surely will help. On the harm side of the ledger, as the so-called
tiers of scrutiny recognize, the nature of the harm affects what it takes
to justify it.293 We can acknowledge the potential contestability of the
“nature” of harm and still recognize that a persistent disparate impact
in the administration of criminal justice (for example) is particularly
inexcusable.294
What of direct engagement with problematic history? In section
V.A.2, I discuss further the possibility that a government contests the
wrongfulness of T1. For now, though, note that this approach does
not require governmental concession on this point. It simply requires
explicit engagement with the reasons that could support such a conclusion. That is, the government must treat them as genuine concerns to
be addressed to the maximum extent possible consistent with the (by
hypothesis) important reasons that justify the policy notwithstanding
the persistent disparate impact.295 This hearkens back to the need for
public-regarding reasons acceptable by all to justify the maintenance of
this policy — whether or not “all” agree on taint.296 Those reasons
should at least acknowledge the relevance of the “uncomfortable
past.”297 Engagement engenders productive disruption by forcing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
292
293

See supra pp. 1224–25.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996) (noting varying permissibility of “inherent differences” justifications for differential treatment).
294 Cf. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017) (asserting that racial discrimination is “especially pernicious in the administration of justice” (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 555 (1979))).
295 My suggestion thus fleshes out Justice Sotomayor’s interest in examining whether the state
has “grappled” with the policy’s history. See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410
(2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
296 See supra p. 1241.
297 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2293 n.2 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting id. at 2273 (Alito, J., concurring)).
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reconsideration and justification beyond “this is how we’ve always
done it.” Even where the government ultimately can justify the policy,
this process may generate a policy whose impacts fall more equally
across the population.
To sum up, taint triggers a decision rule that first looks to disparate
impact. If necessary, courts then apply heightened scrutiny. Although, in
a sense, the plaintiff’s burden of production is lessened vis-à-vis the
usual case — that is, she need “only” show taint to shift a burden of
production to the government — so too is the government’s responsive
burden of production.298 In the normal case where a plaintiff shows
the action was motivated in part by proscribed intent, the government
must show that the motivation was not a but-for cause, and satisfy
strict scrutiny if it cannot.299 Conversely, where taint supports a
prima facie case, the government need not show narrow tailoring that
satisfies a compelling interest. It need only show that legitimate reasons support the policy, that it has accounted for the problematic
history, and that any persisting disparate impact is unavoidable and
outweighed by the benefits of the legitimate justifications.
This approach avoids strict scrutiny without merely offering a
blueprint to unaccountable taint laundering. First, unlike rational
basis review, where a government need not have any particularly good
reasons for passing a law, a tainted law must be justified by legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons (beyond inertia) that independently would
generate the policy. Second, unlike the mine-run case, disparate impact still has to be justified. And showing that it is unavoidable often
will require at least showing that making the policy progressive is
impossible due to the policy’s nature. Third, because post hoc reasons
will not suffice, taint will sometimes operate to force formal
reenactment to place sufficient reasons on the record. That ought to
increase confidence that the reasons given actually are weighty.
This also guards against a potential misunderstanding. Abbott
raised concerns about improper “shifting” of the burden of proof in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
298 I emphasize that shifting the burden of production does not shift the ultimate burden of
proof (sometimes called the burden of persuasion). See Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs,
Dep’t of Lab. v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272–76 (1994) (distinguishing the concepts);
cf. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170–73, 171 n.6 (2005) (discussing how Batson’s prima facie model never shifts the ultimate burden of proof, but does shift the burden of production to
“determine the persuasiveness of the . . . constitutional claim,” id. at 171).
299 See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228
(1985); BANKS ET AL., supra note 276, at 410; Verstein, supra note 258, at 1125, 1127, 1144, 1162;
cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003) (upholding race-conscious affirmative action
policy under strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643–44 (1993) (stating that strict scrutiny principles apply to race-neutral policies that are, “on their face, ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race.’” (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977))).
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cases involving discriminatory predecessors.300 The Court thought the
lower court erred by forcing Texas to prove a legislative “change of
heart” and engagement in a “deliberative process to ensure” that the
new policy “cured any taint.”301
However one reads the lower court’s opinion in that case, taint
(properly understood) is perfectly consistent with conventional
allocations of the burden of proof. Showing taint proves wrongful discrimination no more than a Batson prima facie case does.302 Taint
does generate a burden for the government defendant, however — a
burden of production, just as a prima facie case does in Batson and Title VII disparate treatment cases.303 Here, as there, failure to discharge that burden counts against the government in the final
determination.304
None of this means that taint changes the ultimate burden of proof,
or that past wrongfulness is dispositive of present wrongfulness.
Rather, it simply points to one reasonable path for some plaintiffs to
satisfy their burden of proof. Perhaps that means that plaintiffs in
taint cases have an easier time relative to others, but that seems no
more problematic than plaintiffs in cases involving overt discrimination having an easier time than plaintiffs in covert discrimination
cases. Differently situated plaintiffs have different advantages. Thus,
Abbott’s complaints of original sin “condemn[ing] governmental action
that is not itself unlawful” and disrespect for the presumption of good
faith305 are orthogonal. Taint means that, at least sometimes, present
good faith is insufficient. Sometimes, the unpurged taint of past discrimination may be a fact about contemporary government action that
indicates its unlawfulness, irrespective of its good faith enactment.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
300 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324–25 (2018) (“[I]t was the plaintiffs’ burden to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith and show that the [T2] Legislature acted with invidious intent. The
[lower] court contravened these basic principles.” Id. at 2325.).
301 Id. at 2325 (quoting Perez v. Abbott, 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 649 (W.D. Tex. 2017)).
302 Cf. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169–71, 169 n.5 (noting that “a prima facie case of discrimination
can be made out by offering a wide variety of evidence,” id. at 169, and emphasizing that Batson
recognized that step one was satisfied where defendant timely objected to the striking of all Black
persons on the venire).
303 See USPS Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714–17 (1983) (describing the prima
facie burden-shifting method applicable in Title VII cases); cf. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 n.7 (noting similarity between Title VII burden shifting and Batson burden shifting). Indeed,
mine-run equal protection doctrine embraces the same approach by shifting the burden to the
government to disprove that discriminatory motivation was a but-for cause when a plaintiff
shows such motivation played a part in a decision. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 & n.21.
304 See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 & n.6. I leave unresolved the possibility that taint cases might
warrant making such a failure conclusive.
305 Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)
(plurality opinion)).
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C. Exemplars
I turn now to consider whether taint actually can aid judges considering T1/T2 cases. Exemplar cases from the Supreme Court and
lower courts demonstrate that it can. As my discussion in section IV.D
should make clear, any conclusions that courts should not find taint
should not be taken as conclusions that taint “does not exist” in some
metaphysical sense, or that nonjudicial actors are barred from concluding otherwise and acting accordingly. Finally, because purging inquiries are context sensitive, different or additional facts could generate
different conclusions. This is a necessary and laudable feature of a
functional approach that both takes taint seriously and finds value in
permitting its genuine purging.
1. Ramos v. Louisiana. — Treated only as a Sixth Amendment
case, one could fairly ask (as the Ramos dissent did) why the racist
origins of Louisiana’s jury-nonunanimity rule mattered, especially given the adoption and endorsement of similar rules by apparently
blameless institutions.306 The majority opinion noted the origins while
criticizing previous Justices’ reasoning, but did not elaborate on the
Sixth Amendment relevance (if any).307 Nor, vis-à-vis those origins,
did it offer a detailed answer to the dissent’s emphasis on the readoption of the rules “under different circumstances.”308
Of course, the Court could resolve only the claim brought. But one
suspects that litigation decisions were informed by concern that courts
would treat the readoption as defanging a Fourteenth Amendment
claim. Taint could have cleaned up the analysis by showing how a
court could be made to see the readoption’s unique constitutional
problem. The argument, in short: continuity in institution, subject
matter, and effect (permitting nonunanimous convictions) showed
patent continuity between old and new, notwithstanding the passage of
time and the tweak in the jurors needed for conviction from
nine to ten.
Importantly, saying that much does not dictate a result. Taint
makes relief possible absent present-day bad motives, but analysis remains.309 While a bit of speculation is required, the best analysis
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
306
307

Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1426–27 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1401 & n.44 (majority opinion) (indicating that even a nonunanimity rule with
benign origins would be unconstitutional); see also id. at 1405. One concurrence noted the origins
as supporting overruling any precedent that would permit the rule. See id. at 1417 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
308 Id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting). A concurrence assayed an answer: the readoption insufficiently “grappled with the laws’ sordid history.” Id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). But it
did not detail what that should look like. See supra note 295.
309 As noted, taint should still be relevant to even the strictest specific-intent framework as
evidence of potential pretext. See supra section III.A, pp. 1227–28.
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would be that Louisiana could not defend the rule as it came to the
Court. The rule’s disparate impact persisted, and the disparity’s
source — the rule’s interaction with Black Americans’ minority
status — seemed essentially inherent.310 The disparate impact fell in
the criminal justice area. And Louisiana’s refusal to acknowledge the
rule’s racist origins311 would pose obstacles to showing that the legitimate need for this rule in this form outweighed the harm of shielding
its tainted disparate impact. Although we cannot know what interest
Louisiana would have articulated under this Article’s framework, I
cannot think of one that is precisely stated enough to make it plausible
that nonunanimity is necessary to pursue it. Invalidation on equal
protection grounds was thus appropriate.312
What then? If committed to nonunanimity, Louisiana would need
to find some version of that policy that eliminated disparate impact, or
produce more robust justifications that actually attended to the policy’s history. If such justifications sounded in judicial efficiency,313 it
would count against Louisiana that there are alternative ways to pursue that vaguely stated goal. Absent a more precisely articulated goal
that Louisiana genuinely needed nonunanimity to pursue, it might well
be that discharging the taint would be impossible given persistent disparate impact. I cannot say for sure without knowing every possible
potential interest, but the important takeaway is that there may well
be cases where persistent disparate impact is indeed fatal to
reenactment.
2. Trump v. Hawaii. — Taint also illuminates the Travel Ban case.
The compressed temporality, intervening litigation events, and clear
subject-matter continuity strongly support a line of descent from Bans
1 and 2 to Ban 3.314 For the majority, all that mattered was whether
Ban 3 itself violated the Establishment Clause notwithstanding its facial validity.315 As against the extrinsic evidence of candidate and
President Trump’s statements and behavior, the majority emphasized
the worldwide review process that preceded Ban 3 and the government’s ultimate removal of three majority-Muslim countries from the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
310 See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1418–19 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Frampton, Jim Crow
Jury, supra note 107, at 1598–99.
311 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1426 & n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting).
312 Interestingly, unlike the actual holding, this holding might have permitted states with different institutional histories to experiment with nonunanimity. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 215, at
225 n.291 (noting support and critique of the states-as-laboratories-of-democracy tradition). The
desirability of such experiments is unclear.
313 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1427 n.3 (Alito, J., dissenting) (offering such justifications).
314 See supra p. 1204.
315 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018).
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third list.316 As previously observed, these were two of Ban 3’s most
notable differences.317
An opinion that grappled with taint would look quite different.
True, the government never conceded invalidity. But the earlier bans’
wrongfulness was not just plausible, but actually found in reasoned
adjudications.318 And the third ban still created a disparate religious
burden. A better analysis would have consequently shifted a burden
of production to the government to demonstrate that a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory need for this policy (notwithstanding its origins)
outweighed the persistent disparate impact.
No doubt, any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that the interagency review generated would be relevant. The government would
still need to show that legitimate interests would be substantially
impaired without this type of ban. Moreover, in determining ultimate
validity, those reasons would have to be reconciled with the damning
pre–interagency review evidence, with more skepticism than the Court
applied.319 Trump appeared to give near-dispositive weight to the interagency review and certain “ex post procedures.”320 Taint renders
insufficient the mere existence of facially neutral text or procedures.
The government should still have had to engage with the problematic
predecessor evidence and articulate expressly how legitimate needs
outweighed persistent disparate impact.
Trump thus shows how taint justifiably counterbalances the sort of
apparently benign context that can insulate a facially neutral policy
from scrutiny.321 For example, perhaps a history of unquestionably legitimate orders of this “form and substance” indeed preexisted this
Presidency.322 Something like “good taint” might well matter. But the
government should have had to articulate, and the Court should have
had to evaluate, whether those more distant policies tipped the purgative scale.323
Again, some tainted policies can be justified, so proposing a different approach to Trump does not dictate an outcome. The case,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
316
317
318

Id. at 2421–22.
See id. at 2404–05, 2422; Issacharoff & Morrison, supra note 207, at 1943.
I bracket the context-specific question of whether the national security context could possibly require ignoring the “extrinsic evidence” critical to this assertion. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at
2419–20 (raising but not deciding this question).
319 See id. (applying rational basis review).
320 Cf. Landau, supra note 1, at 2152 (categorizing Trump as an example of how courts “frequently sustain challenged acts . . . when those acts are the result of a thorough process”).
321 See Haney-López, supra note 25, at 1839 (observing judicial use of contextual evidence to
“build the case for [governmental] innocence”); Landau, supra note 1, at 2173.
322 See Issacharoff & Morrison, supra note 207, at 1947–48.
323 Regarding a statutory interpretation question, the Court parenthetically referenced past entry restrictions issued under the relevant statute, but did not suggest they mattered to the constitutional question. See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2409–10, 2413.
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regardless, helps show how and why a compressed temporal span matters. Whatever one’s ultimate view of Ban 3, the facts are consistent
with an attempt to launder taint through the involvement of subordinates. That risk exists in any compressed-time case, and suggests that
taint is hardest to purge where the same individual final decisionmaker affirms a functionally identical institutional decision within a
tight time span. Here, the blame and task responsibility underpinning
taint is at its zenith. Accordingly, absent a final-decisionmaker change,
a substantial showing of altered circumstances would have been the
most reliable way for the government to earn clean-slate treatment for
a follow-on travel ban.
To be sure, it is fair to acknowledge that courts may find it
uniquely challenging to weigh the substantiality of national security
claims. Taint would not necessarily bar a similar ban if, years later,
the specific countries involved posed a specifically identified, novel national security threat. Still, national security is not a Constitution-free
zone, and section IV.B’s standard would demand more than a nonspecific invocation of “national security” to defend a tainted policy.
Ultimately, the sensitivity of the analysis that taint calls for complicates any self-assured declaration of who ought to have won, considered post hoc. At minimum, the facts recounted in the opinion itself
would not have sufficed to purge the taint of the initial policy.
Perhaps more could have been offered. If so, taint would at least have
extracted a more robust showing and an unequivocal disavowal of
Trump’s damning statements.324 Regardless, any outcome must stem
from more than context laundering — whether pretextual or merely
corollary to time’s passage and genuinely well-intentioned behavior.
3. Abbott v. Perez. — Abbott helps show the framework’s useful
granularity.
The story began with Texas drawing its post-2010 census redistricting maps, which generated immediate litigation in both Texas federal
court and the D.C. federal court.325 A Texas federal district court
devised interim maps pending the litigation’s resolution, but the
Supreme Court vacated those interim maps in 2012.326 In remanding,
the Court instructed the federal district court to draw interim maps
based on the original maps except insofar as modification was required
to avoid “incorporat[ing] . . . any legal defects.”327 Thus, the lower
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
324
325

See Verstein, supra note 170, at 768, 782 n.168.
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2315 (2018); Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133,
138–39 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting Texas’s request for judicial preclearance of its maps for Federal
House elections and Texas House and Senate elections).
326 Abbott, 138 S. Ct at 2315–16. The maps were vacated as insufficiently deferential to the
originals.
327 Id. at 2316 (quoting Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 394 (2012) (per curiam)).
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court was to modify any district regarding which it thought plaintiffs
were likely to succeed on claims under the Constitution or section 2 of
the VRA, or which it thought could support any “not insubstantial”
claim under section 5 of the VRA.328
After the lower court did so,329 the D.C. federal court held that
section 5 of the VRA barred preclearance of the original maps.330
Texas then repealed the original maps, adopted the interim map for
Federal House elections without change, and adopted the interim map
for State House elections with some modification.331 Next, the Texas
federal court concluded that the first maps were unconstitutional and
that “the racially discriminatory intent and effects [of those maps]
carr[ied] over into the 2013 [T2] plans where . . . district lines remain
unchanged.”332 Abbott examined those T2 maps.
The majority’s core argument was that the lower court erred by reversing the ultimate burden of proof.333 One can argue about what
the district court actually did. In my view, however, it appeared to
have been reaching for something similar to this Article’s proposal to
understand taint as shifting a burden of production to the state
without changing the ultimate burden of proof. If so, the court (and
other similarly situated courts) could have prevented reviewing-court
confusion by employing this Article’s vocabulary. Similarly, the taint
framework could have strengthened the dissent’s challenge to the
burden-of-proof argument,334 and offered guidance for lower courts in
need of a framework consistent with Abbott’s concerns.335
Insofar as Abbott implicitly equates recognizing taint with reversing
the burden of proof, this Article shows why that reasoning fails. On
these complex facts, however, the majority perhaps had a
(different) point.
Treating the initial maps as T1, it was at “T1.5” that the Texas federal court followed the Supreme Court’s instructions to create interim
Then, at T2,
maps that eliminated potential legal defects.336
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
328
329
330

Id.
Perez v. Abbott, 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 632–33 (W.D. Tex. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2316. As relevant here, the court denied preclearance because Texas
failed to prove (as section 5 required) that its Federal House of Representatives map was enacted
without discriminatory purpose. Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 151–52, 161–62. It also failed to prove
that its State House map had no impermissibly “retrogressive effect.” Id. at 177; see also id. at
139.
331 Perez, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 634; see also Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2317.
332 Perez, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (Federal House plan); Perez v. Abbott (Perez II), 267 F. Supp.
3d 750, 757–58, 794–95 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (same finding for State House plan).
333 Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2324–25.
334 See id. at 2353–54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
335 Cf. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 303–05 (4th Cir. 2020)
(concluding that the district court reversed the burden of proof in contravention of Abbott).
336 See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2328.
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Texas’s new maps essentially (or verbatim) adopted the T1.5 maps. To
be sure, those interim maps did take as a baseline the T1 maps, and
the interim maps were expressly preliminary.337 But for purposes of
detecting a tainted relationship, it is striking that a different institution, operating under a materially different mandate, intervened at
T1.5 to change the T1 policy in a way explicitly pegged to eliminating
wrongfulness.
Normally, the institutional and subject matter continuity, close
temporal relationship, and relationship to litigation would support a
taint finding. But, if the animating idea is continuity, continuity was
arguably cut in a clear way here.338 The Court came close to recognizing this in its emphasis on that intervening event, although it confused
matters by framing its displeasure as rooted in burdens of proof.339
The better argument would have been that the lower court wrongly
added tainted continuity to the plaintiffs’ side of the scale. Put
bluntly, taint should not have aided the plaintiffs here. As all recognized, the 2011 maps were relevant — but in the conventional, holistic
way that history matters, not the special-decision-rule way taint
justifies.
4. Federal Criminal Unlawful Entry and Reentry Provisions. — As
this Article goes to press, lower-court challenges to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–
1326 are percolating. These immigration law provisions criminalize
unlawful entry and unlawful reentry under certain conditions.340 The
first versions of these provisions appeared in the 1929 Undesirable
Aliens Act,341 which also criminalized unlawful entry and reentry.342
No court considering challenges to the provisions has disputed the
substantial evidence that the 1929 Act enacted wrongful
discrimination.343
Since 1929, Congress has reenacted and amended these criminal
provisions multiple times, including as part of major immigration re-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
337
338

Id. at 2316.
This could be countered in the dissent’s register: the T1.5 intervention was too preliminary
to support this weight. See, e.g., id. at 2348 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
339 See id. at 2325 (majority opinion).
340 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326.
341 Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, ch. 690, § 2, 45 Stat. 1551.
342 Id.
343 See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, No. 20-cr-00026, 2021 WL 3667330, at *7–9, *14
(D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2021) (citing legal historians, legislative history, and congressional testimony to
explain how the Act was enacted to keep out “undesirable” groups, such as migrants from Mexico,
and “to keep America’s identity white,” id. at *14); see also id. at *7 & n.17 (noting the government’s concession that the 1929 law violated equal protection principles); United States v.
Novondo-Ceballos, No. 21-CR-383, 2021 WL 3570229, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 12, 2021) (discussing
the “[Undesirable Alien’s Act]’s admittedly racist origins,” id. at *6).
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forms in 1952 and 1990.344 But the operative core — criminalizing unlawful entry and reentry — has persisted unchanged. Changes have
worked around the edges, to increase penalties, governmental enforcement authority, or the scope of persons subject to penalties.345
And no intervening event identified in the cases thus far rises to the
level of cutting the continuity chain — the mere passage of time is insufficient, as is the mere presence of intervening reenactment.
Accordingly, we can fairly impute to subsequent policy enactors the
task and blame responsibility contemplated in section II.D.
Stepping through the analysis this way reveals the error in validating the present policies on the grounds that we should not
“automatically impute . . . past motivations to the current law and forgo analysis of the enacting legislature.”346 Taint is relevant to claims of
intentional pretext. But the concept also clarifies and supports claims
not premised on proscribed motivation, which thus do not require any
automatic motivational imputation.
On this Article’s approach, the current laws are tainted. For
present purposes, I will assume that persistent disparate impact is
demonstrated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of persons
apprehended at the border are from Mexico or Latin America.347 As
things stand, the present laws reflect insufficient engagement with past
problematic history. We may stipulate that substantial benign context
accompanied later reenactments, and that changes elsewhere in the
immigration laws embraced nondiscrimination principles.348 But, as
even a court that rejected a challenge acknowledged, Congress’s
reenactments have neither specifically referenced the 1929 law nor en–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
344 Carrillo-Lopez, 2021 WL 3667330, at *4 & n.11, *13, *23–24 (section 1326); United States v.
Rios-Montano, No. 19-CR-2123, 2020 WL 7226441, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020) (section 1325).
345 Carrillo-Lopez, 2021 WL 3667330, at *13, *23 (section 1326); Rios-Montano, 2020 WL
7226441, at *4 (calling section 1325 “substantially similar” to its original form).
346 E.g., United States v. Gallegos-Aparicio, No. 19-CR-2637, 2020 WL 7318124, at *3 (S.D. Cal
Dec. 10, 2020); Rios-Montano, 2020 WL 7226441, at *4.
347 See, e.g., Novondo-Ceballos, 2021 WL 3570229, at *1; Carrillo-Lopez, 2021 WL 3667330, at
*15; United States v. Machic-Xiap, No. 19-cr-407, 2021 WL 3362738, at *10–11 (D. Or. Aug. 3,
2021). This assumption could be contested on baseline grounds, i.e., disparate relative to what
nondisparate baseline? Compare Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S.
Ct. 1891, 1915 (2021) (downplaying an immigration policy’s substantial impact on Latinos
“because Latinos make up a large share of the unauthorized alien population”), with CarrilloLopez, 2021 WL 3667330, at *6–7 (rejecting the government’s attribution of impact to “geography” and Latinos’ higher share of unauthorized alien population, in part because of “over-policing
of . . . the Southern border,” id. at *7).
348 See, e.g., Rios-Montano, 2020 WL 7226441, at *5–7 (finding, in 1990 legislative history, general “balancing of valid immigration considerations,” support from progressive organizations, and
an absence of contemporary racial animus, id. at *7); United States v. Gutierrez-Barba, No. CR19-01224-001, 2021 WL 2138801, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 25, 2021) (discussing a 1965 amendment to
other parts of immigration laws to include a nondiscrimination provision and removal of nationalorigin quotas).
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gaged with the risks of perpetuating a plausibly discriminatory past.349
Whatever else might be said about other provisions of the original law,
the entry and reentry provisions have been carried forward functionally unchanged. At least where, as here, no one seriously disputes the
original law’s illegitimate nature, specific engagement demands more
of the contemporary decisionmaker. Congress could show the necessary engagement by, for example, acknowledging the reprehensible
mentalities animating the original act, investigating the historical and
ongoing impact of the criminal provisions, articulating why the criminal provisions remain necessary notwithstanding ongoing impact, and
taking feasible steps to minimize that impact. In short, the necessary
engagement at least requires appreciating the persistent impact
of the past.
While the specific-engagement factor does not require the government to have formally conceded the original law’s illegitimacy, it may
often warrant at least initial invalidation of a tainted law. But lest the
reader think taint inevitably “fatal in fact,”350 these laws are otherwise
strong candidates for plausible purging if a subsequent reenactment
evinces better engagement.
Assuming the legitimacy of controlling entry into the country, preventing unlawful entry is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest. I
have assumed disparate impact thus far, but the demographics of the
population attempting entry at least makes plausible a government
claim that any attempt to prevent unlawful entry will generate some
such impact. Despite that impact, some policy compelling compliance
with this legitimate interest seems indispensable, lest that interest be a
mere suggestion. Thus, the government would have strong arguments
that the legitimate interest would be substantially impaired absent this
policy, in a way that demonstrates that the need for the policy outweighs the persistent taint-rooted harm.
The strongest counterargument would be the plausibility of preventing unlawful entry through civil violations only, rather than criminal violations.351 While this counter is substantial, taint does not
mandate strict scrutiny–like narrow tailoring. Given a weighty, legitimate interest in preventing unlawful entry, and the magnitude of attempts to accomplish such entry,352 a court can reasonably accept the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
349 See, e.g., Rios-Montano, 2020 WL 7226441, at *5–6; see also Carrillo-Lopez, 2021 WL
3667330, at *24.
350 Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
351 See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, Some Democrats Want to Decriminalize Illegal Border
Crossings. Would It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/
31/us/border-crossing-decriminalization.html [https://perma.cc/Y3BA-MFE9].
352 See, e.g., Joel Rose, Border Patrol Apprehensions Hit a Record High. But That’s Only Part
of the Story, NPR (Oct. 23, 2021, 7:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/10/23/1048522086/
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government’s claim that the pursuit of that interest would be substantially impaired if it were precluded from using criminal sanctions.
Note, still, that the necessity claim is specific and tied to the policy’s
existence in this form; a vague invocation of “deterrence” as a legitimate interest would be insufficient. To pass muster, the claim also has
to be tied to the specific, history-conscious engagement sketched
above.
To be sure, one might reject the strength of the interest in preventing unlawful entry or conclude that on balance the availability of civil
penalties vitiates the necessity claim for criminal penalties. The foregoing analysis simply aims to demonstrate that a robust argument for
purging is possible on these facts, given the precision with which the
interest can be stated and connected to the policy. In the end, though,
these examples are given not because the standard mandates only one
possible answer, but to show how the taint standard can regiment and
routinize the important questions we should care about.
5. Lower Court Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter ID Cases. —
Finally, a conceptual note on the lower court felon disenfranchisement
and voter ID cases may illuminate taint’s value. I will limit my analysis to explaining how taint would clarify and streamline the appropriate analysis.
The felon disenfranchisement cases, and one of the voter ID cases,
advanced the temporally minimalist proposition that any substantive
change severed any potential tainted continuity, with one going so far
as to treat the removal of a sunset provision as making all the difference.353 Taint precludes such a cursory analysis. Assuming presentday disparate impact,354 the right question is whether the state can
justify restricting access to the vote in this tainted manner. These
cases cannot be resolved by simply invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment’s apparent general endorsement of some felon
disenfranchisement.355
The fact-intensive nature of the analysis cautions against factindependent speculation regarding the outcomes of these varied cases.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
border-patrol-apprehensions-hit-a-record-high-but-thats-only-part-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/
R3NZ-2ZM5]; Eileen Sullivan & Miriam Jordan, Illegal Border Crossings, Driven by Pandemic
and Natural Disasters, Soar to Record High, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/us/politics/border-crossings-immigration-record-high.html [https://
perma.cc/E8NW-P3PM].
353 See Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 164–67 (2d Cir. 2010); see also supra section I.C.1, pp.
1204–07.
354 See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 459 & n.56 (2019) (noting and collecting sources on disparate impact of felony disenfranchisement laws); see also supra
note 265.
355 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (relying on section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “affirmative sanction” of such laws).
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But taint does place some governmental defenses out of bounds. For
example, because a legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest that would
be substantially impaired is necessary, vague invocations of (for example) “fraud” would be insufficient. Of course, if the state could show
actual fraud to which the policy in question directly responded, the
story might be different. These cases also suggest how other constitutional values would affect the analysis. Weighted against any state
justification must be voting’s constitutionally “fundamental” status.356
Other aspects of the lower court opinions can be clarified along
lines similar to those previously discussed in relation to Abbott. These
cases cannot be resolved by talismanic invocations of the burden of
proof and presumptions of good faith.357 Taint’s effect must be understood precisely, as going to burdens of production, not burdens of
proof.
D. Taint as a Nonjudicial Tool
To this point, this section has prioritized operationalizing taint in a
way that can help judges. But taint is a “constitutional concept” that
any political actor can understand, although its decisionmaking implications may differ depending on the actor.358 I pause here to examine
those broader possibilities.
First, taint can shape how nonjudicial actors understand their obligations to their constituents. So, for example, a city council or
legislature might gather information on a current policy’s link to a discriminatory predecessor, with an eye for the continuity Part II describes. And, in a more demosprudential or popular constitutionalist
vein,359 an engaged citizenry could draw on the language of taint to
prompt such information gathering (or to guide independent information gathering).
Second, nonjudicial taint conclusions need not duplicate judicial
conclusions. Practically speaking, these actors “do” different things.
Courts must resolve concrete cases brought to them based on the information the parties provide in an adversarial setting, under constraints like rules of evidence, justiciability, and others.360 The relative
freedom of other actors may mean they simply will have more — or
better — information bearing on taint.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
356
357

Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 303–05 (4th Cir. 2020);
Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 801–02 (5th Cir. 2018). But see Raymond, 981 F.3d at 306–07
(suggesting that a ballot measure was a relevant “intervening event,” id. at 306).
358 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213–14 (1978).
359 See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of
Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749 (2014).
360 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 30, at 1829–31.
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Conclusions may differ for deeper reasons. Even if a constitutional
challenge invoking taint fails in litigation, nonjudicial actors could
conclude that it exists and that it warrants remediation. After all, information access aside, there can be room for disagreement about taint
at multiple stages of this analysis.361 If this is not a feature, it is at
least not a bug. Constitutional law often generates reasonable disagreement,362 and the entailments of the “taint” concept are hardly less
determinate than those of “equal protection.”363 Within their spheres,
nonjudicial actors can apply, and act upon, their independent constitutional judgment.364 So far, I simply mean to observe that different
actors might agree on constitutional meaning and the approach to divining compliance with that meaning and still reach good faith, disparate conclusions on outcomes.
Examples include simple
disagreement about the existence, in a particular case, of a sufficient
intertemporal nexus, or disagreement about whether the T2 actors
sufficiently purged the taint.
Moreover, nonjudicial actors might simply reject a judicial decision
rule. Imagine that a court agrees that the factual basis for “taint” exists in a particular equal protection case, but refuses relief for lack of
specific intent at T2.365 That decision would turn on how that court
determines compliance with the constitutional equal protection mandate — that is, by searching for specific intent. Nonjudicial actors
need not embrace that decision rule. They could instead apply a test
of compliance that does not require specific intent in taint cases. This
choice could be informed by disagreements over underlying constitutional meaning (say, a belief that wrongful discrimination simply “is”
more capacious than actions taken with specific intent), but it need not
be. It could be justified on nothing more than a belief that whatever

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
361
362

See infra section V.A, pp. 1261–65.
See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 606, 656 (2008).
363 See Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 613 (1999).
364 Although departmentalism and popular constitutionalism can be controversial, “almost no
one — and maybe no one at all — thinks that nonjudicial officials should not make constitutional
judgments, and act on them, even in some contexts in which their judgments diverge from those
that courts have made or would make.”
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy,
Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 499 (2018). Since
extended exploration of those arguments is beyond this Article’s scope, I should be taken as
advocating whatever level of nonjudicial constitutional judgment the reader finds congenial.
365 This is one way to understand a recent case rejecting an equal protection claim for lack of
“racial animus” despite simultaneously recognizing that “the historical foundation of the current
law can be traced back to the earlier statute.” United States v. Machic-Xiap, No. 19-cr-407, 2021
WL 3362738, at *15 (D. Or. Aug. 3, 2021); see id. at *10.
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the content of the underlying constitutional meaning, specific intent is
orthogonal to enforcing that meaning.366
Third, taint can justify added judicial deference to a democratic actor’s independent detection and correction of a problem. Judicial and
nonjudicial actors, charged equally with following the Constitution,367
might simply disagree in good faith on the taint concept’s applicability
or application. Given taint’s constitutional dimensions, and the institutional advantages of nonjudicial bodies, courts should defer to that
divergent nonjudicial judgment. Sometimes, added deference would
just overdetermine the outcome. But some decisions are of a sort that
courts might otherwise scrutinize skeptically, such as race-conscious
decisions. There, courts should look approvingly on a decision
credibly invoking a taint finding, even if a taint-based litigation challenge to the status quo ante would have failed.
Perhaps the most apt place for such deference is the congressional
power to “enforce” the Reconstruction Amendments “by appropriate
legislation.”368 I bracket questions regarding whether and to what extent the power to “enforce” includes congressional power to determine
constitutional meaning.369 Irrespective of one’s view on judicial
interpretive supremacy, “appropriate” at least should embrace deference to a congressional act premised on a factual finding of taint and
otherwise claiming no interpretive authority.370 Indeed, for two of the
three Reconstruction Amendment enforcement powers, judicial doctrine already countenances that view.
Most clearly, the Court’s extant approach to the Thirteenth
Amendment enforcement power defers to congressional power
“rationally to determine . . . the badges and the incidents of slavery.”371
This approach recognizes that meaningful aspects of the “slavery” that
section 1 abolishes can persist. Just as important, it recognizes the
propriety of deferring to Congress’s judgment that it has persisted.
Taint-based deference also fits the Fourteenth Amendment context.
True, the Court here has cut back on more expansive visions, insisting
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
366 At the margin, the distinction between decision rules and underlying meaning can get
murky. See Berman, supra note 216, at 79–83, 108–13; Roosevelt, supra note 218, at 1655. But,
as the text accompanying this footnote should indicate, nothing here turns on a bright-line distinction. If the court refuses relief because it simply thinks that taint is inconsistent with the “real”
meaning of the Constitution, a nonjudicial actor could still disagree.
367 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
368 Balkin, supra note 30, at 1808 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2). I would approach
similarly the several later amendments that contain similar language. See id.
369 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1527 & n.246 (2007); McConnell, supra note 29, at 170–71.
370 This much seems justifiable given the Reconstruction Framers’ well-established distrust of
the judiciary. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 29, at 181–84; Balkin, supra note 30, at 1850 &
n.185.
371 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
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that appropriate legislation is only that which is “remedial” in a way
that is “congruent and proportional” to the Supreme Court’s understanding of constitutional meaning.372 Putting aside the critiques of
that approach,373 a congressional finding of taint should still generate
increased deference. After all, the congruent-and-proportional test still
permits prophylactic action to “deter[] or remed[y] constitutional violations,”374 so long as Congress does not claim “to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees.”375 Treating taint as a predicate for the
exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power requires no
substantive redefinition. It need imply only that Congress is persuaded of the need to remedy the persistent taint of a constitutional violation that a court has found or would find.376 And it should matter to a
court when Congress is persuaded.
As for the Fifteenth Amendment, the most notable recent case,
Shelby County v. Holder,377 illuminates precisely because of its insufficient deference to taint-based legislative judgment. At its heart, the
case was about the enforcement power implications of Congress independently finding and addressing taint. Specifically, it boiled down to
the permissibility of Congress’s conclusion that the discrimination that
originally justified the VRA’s preclearance coverage formula persisted
in an evolved form that supported carrying the formula forward unchanged.378 Even granting the norm of “equal state sovereignty” as
the Court articulated it,379 the decision turned on whether Congress’s
taint-based judgment sufficed to justify a deviation from that norm.
Taking taint seriously as a constitutional concept within Congress’s
concurrent bailiwick would have produced a majority opinion much
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
372 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997); see also McConnell, supra note 29, at
170–74 (critiquing City of Boerne’s view of the enforcement power). The Court has not applied
the “congruent and proportional” test to the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
373 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 818–27 (1999);
McConnell, supra note 29, at 170–74.
374 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518.
375 Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003).
376 Cf. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’
and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.” (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
651 (1966))).
377 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
378 See id. at 536, 553–57. Compare id. at 554 (asserting that the “fundamental problem” was
that “Congress . . . reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the
present day”), with id. at 559 (“The question . . . is who decides whether [the Act] . . . remains justifiable, this Court, or [the] Congress . . . .” (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)), and id. at
575–76 (“Congress also found that voting discrimination had evolved into subtler secondgeneration barriers . . . . The evidence . . . grounded Congress’ conclusion that the remedy should
be retained . . . .”).
379 But see Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1211–16
(2016) (criticizing the concept’s deployment in Shelby County).
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more like Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and the original validation of the
VRA in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.380
Beyond the Federal Congress, other nonjudicial actors can also invoke taint to claim deference. I will sketch three quick examples.
Consider, initially, how President Joseph Biden’s revocation of
President Donald Trump’s travel bans indicted them as “discriminatory” and inconsistent with “religious freedom and tolerance.”381
Although I would prefer a more involved analysis of the taint-related
basis for those assertions, President Biden’s proclamation does provide
a template for a taint-conscious, nonjudicial divergent judgment.
Ideally, such a judgment would apply the approach to detecting taint
outlined in Part II. Note, however, that this Part’s burden-shifting
constraints on what courts should do before a taint-based invalidation382 are less integral to what nonjudicial actors should do when deciding how to respond to taint.
Additionally, President Biden’s proclamation went beyond mere
termination to embrace measures aimed at giving individuals who
were denied visas under the previous regime a second chance under an
untainted one.383 Explicitly framing the revocation as a taint-based
constitutional decision could have justified even more substantial reparative measures that, for example, expressly targeted race, religion,
or nationality.
For another example, consider the facts in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.384 No court ever
held Seattle’s schools to have been segregated by law.385 But, during
the decades following Brown, multiple lawsuits challenged the city’s
monochromatic schools as the unlawful products of school board action.386 The board responded to those lawsuits by adopting integrative
plans and — in one instance — by reaching a formal settlement
agreement.387
The Parents Involved Court indicated that the absence of a formal
court holding of de jure segregation barred Seattle from invoking past
discrimination as an interest justifying its race-conscious school–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
380
381

383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Biden Administration Reverses Trump Administration Policies on Immigration and
Asylum, 115 AM. J. INT’L L. 340, 341–42 (2021) (quoting Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry
to the United States, Proclamation No. 10,141, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,005, 7,005 (Jan. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Biden Proclamation]).
382 See supra sections IV.A–B, pp. 1237–45.
383 Biden Proclamation, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7,005; see also Biden Administration Reverses Trump
Administration Policies on Immigration and Asylum, supra note 381, at 342.
384 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
385 See id. at 712; id. at 806–07, 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
386 See id. at 808–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
387 See id. at 807.
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assignment plans.388 A taint-sensitive analysis would counsel otherwise. Sufficient evidence existed from which a modern board could
conclude that past school-board policies in fact constituted wrongful
discrimination.389 Irrespective of whether a court formally declared
those policies invalid, taint as a constitutional concept recognizes modern decisionmakers as competent to conclude that contemporary policies with persistent disparate effect are tainted by that past. If they so
conclude, and act to purge that taint, this Article’s model calls for judicial deference to that constitutionally based judgment.
Finally, more hypothetically, imagine the Supreme Court had applied a taint analysis in Ramos and upheld the Oregon nonunanimous
jury provision that the state had reenacted decades after its original,
problematic enactment.390 Oregon could always have repealed the
provision. But nonjudicial actors also could have independently applied the basic idea of taint to argue for repeal. Indeed, my proposed
judicial decision rule could be instructive here: they might argue that
complete revocation is necessary because the policy is insufficiently
important to justify the amount of disparate impact that would persist
if retained in any form.
Importantly, once detected, taint can justify going beyond mere repeal. Those steps could be flexible and targeted, untrammeled by doctrines like retroactivity or the permissible scope of judicial relief. In
the Ramos-based example, new trials for convicted persons might be
one option. Another might be targeted investment in areas whose residents were disproportionately affected by the provision. For an election law example, take Virginia’s recent State Voting Rights Act,
passed by a state formerly subject to preclearance under the Federal
VRA.391 Although the legislative text does not explicitly draw this
connection, Virginia’s legislature could have invoked taint to justify
the new burdens the new law places on state and local actors. In all
events, these policies should benefit, if challenged, from the deference
that nonjudicial invocation of taint deserves.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
388
389

See id. at 720–21 (majority opinion).
See, e.g., id. at 807–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting, inter alia, past school board memoranda acknowledging racially disparate student-transfer policies and lawsuits attributing monochromatic schools to race-conscious school-attendance policies and district boundary lines).
390 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1426 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). Actually,
Oregon was a nonparty, but I tweak the facts for simplicity since Louisiana had repealed its law
by the time of Ramos.
391 See Reid J. Epstein & Nick Corasaniti, Virginia, the Old Confederacy’s Heart, Becomes a
Voting Rights Bastion, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/
02/us/politics/virginia-voting-rights-northam.html [https://perma.cc/69PH-AKHL]; see also VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-105 (West 2021), https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+ful+
CHAP0533+pdf [https://perma.cc/B2C9-SSYQ].
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V. MOVING FORWARD
I close by exploring some complications and potential areas for future consideration.
A. Complications
Three complications may help illuminate the taint concept further.
First, how should we think about showing taint in litigation? Second,
what if the government contests T1’s wrongfulness? Third, how
might this approach alter incentives?
1. Methods of Proof. — Taint is a relationship, inferred from
historical facts, that may aid the proof of an underlying constitutional
violation.
Thus, plaintiffs should include facts supporting the
relationship’s existence in their complaint and deploy them in line with
this Article’s framework if a defendant challenges the underlying
claim’s viability. Then, the court should determine whether the invocation of taint satisfies the requirements applicable at that stage of litigation; if the case goes to trial, the ultimate factfinder must decide.392
Decisionmakers must apply the same judgment used to resolve
other contested questions. So, for example, a court might ask whether
it is plausible that the ostensible T1 and T2 are functional duplicates,
or whether a reasonable jury could find that an intervening event
supports treating two events as uniquely connected. Like most sensitive, contextual inquiries, the inquiry will never be fully mechanical.
Still, nothing about taint requires courts to treat an implausible invocation as plausible.
2. The Contested T1. — What about disagreement over T1? Even
where most would say the “origins are clear,” as with the nonunanimous jury provision adopted by the delegates of the avowedly White
supremacist 1898 Louisiana constitutional convention, a state may
contest those origins.393 Even if Louisiana’s refusal to concede the
point was not credible in Ramos, surely good faith disagreement will
sometimes be possible. To be clear, taint is conceptually useful
regardless of this complication, so long as some wrongful T1 policies
exist. And this problem will not affect cases arising after a final

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
392 Cf. Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 823 (2018) (discussing
the staged, escalating nature of “textbook” civil procedure).
393 Compare Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394 (noting that “courts in both Louisiana and Oregon” had
“acknowledged that race was a motivating factor” in those states’ adoption of a nonunanimity
rule), with id. at 1426 n.2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that those states’ briefs did in fact contest the rules’ racist origins).
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adjudication of the T1 policy’s wrongfulness.394 I do think, however,
that more can be said about this potential problem.
It is not hard to imagine a government obstructing the efficacious
ascertainment of whether T1 is discriminatory by replacing it with a
policy that has new factual and procedural context, but operates similarly. That is a problem even if taint is only an anti-evasion device.395
Moreover, uncoupling taint from conscious malintent means we can
expect some good faith T2 contestation. But taint would be substantially underinclusive of its purposes if its applicability turned on
whether the defendant agreed that T1 was problematic. Indeed, it
would be least likely to apply where its usefulness may command the
widest agreement: specific-intent T2 pretext. Still, the answer cannot
be absolute deference to the plaintiff’s characterization.
The best solution recalls that taint works as a methodological
heuristic for understanding when history should deny the government
whatever clean-slate treatment facially neutral policies normally receive. Within that framework, we do not examine T1 to determine
whether the government “should have been” liable in the past. We
examine it because T1/T2 continuity makes T1’s circumstances relevant to the government’s T2 justificatory burden. The purpose is not
to issue an advisory opinion on T1, but to ascertain legally relevant
aspects of T1 to the T2 analysis.
Therefore, it is unhelpful to talk of contesting whether T1 was “really” discriminatory. The question is whether what we know about T1
should trigger a taint analysis at T2, not whether T1 was independently unconstitutional. Courts are well equipped to characterize the
meaning of a past event when relevant to evaluating a subsequent, reGiven continuity, T1’s wrongfulness becomes a
lated event.396
material fact for evaluating T2. Decisionmakers can and should resolve disputes about that fact like any other dispute. Accordingly,
nothing here advocates retrospective “prophecies of what the courts
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
394 This Article contains multiple examples of that fact pattern. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 299 (4th
Cir. 2020).
395 See supra section III.A, pp. 1227–28; see generally Denning & Kent, supra note 161.
396 Consider the issue preclusion context, where courts must determine (and the parties often
contest) whether an issue was in fact previously litigated and determined by a valid final judgment to which the determination was essential. See, e.g., Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel
Fashions Grp., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1589, 1594 (2020); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 976–79 (5th ed. 2016). Though different, compare the need for courts, sometimes, to “characteriz[e] the significance or meaning of state
law for constitutional law purposes,” Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of StateCourt Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1935
(2003), distinguishable from “redetermination of state law,” id. at 1936; see id. at 1935–37. Analogously, courts can characterize the significance of the law at T1 for T2 constitutional law purposes
without purporting to “determine” the T1 law.
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w[ould have done] in fact,”397 but only a present-day evaluation of past
facts. Taint aims to identify present-day situations requiring remediation because of their relationship to the past, not to speculate about
what past courts would have done in their day.
Consider Ramos as an exemplar. Modern courts did not simply
defer to Louisiana’s characterization of the original nonunanimity rule,
or terminate analysis of the original rule’s character because
Redemption-era courts would have validated it. Instead, they investigated its wrongfulness by examining, among other things, its adoption
at a racism-suffused convention.398 Similarly, a taint analysis in Trump
would find it important that past courts found the predecessor bans
constitutionally suspect and that Ban 3 was generated in close proximity to the litigation challenging those bans.399 As always, the original
law’s disparate impact or enforcement (or lack thereof) can support an
inference of wrongful discrimination.400 Nothing about the taint concept requires a final judicial decision at T1.
Hard cases will surely exist, with easy-to-imagine examples including where substantial passage of time reduces the amount of useful T1
evidence. Sometimes, that may mean that courts get it “wrong,” in the
sense that they might have reached a different decision with better information. That means the framework may miss some instances, but
so would unqualified deference to either party’s characterization.
Better, I think, to understand taint as a sometimes-difficult question
whose importance justifies the inquiry.
On a final note, taint is everyone’s business, which means the most
complete solution is sometimes political. Perhaps courts sometimes
should underenforce taint, and perhaps the hardest cases of contested
wrongfulness fit that bill.401 But other actors need not duplicate the
judiciary.402 So, for example, perhaps a municipality successfully contests the discriminatory character of its past policy. Within constitutional limits, state or federal governments with the power to overrule
that municipality might wield taint to justify action that effects remedies similar to those sought in the litigation. Less affirmatively, a government that might be able to contest successfully T1’s wrongfulness
might still modify its behavior to obviate a taint attack, for example,
by working to eliminate disparate impacts. If taint generates those
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
397 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (equating
“the law” to such prophecies).
398 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394.
399 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–04 (2018); id. at 2436–38 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); see also supra pp. 1205–06.
400 See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 nn.25–26 (1979).
401 Cf. Sager, supra note 358, at 1226–27 (discussing institution-dependent constitutional norm
enforcement).
402 See supra section IV.D, pp 1255–60.
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results via in terrorem effect,403 it matters little whether it does so via
court order or cautious government bureaucrats. Broadly, then, the
concept does not rise or fall on the resolution of this interesting
question.
3. Incentives, and Palmer. — Two related critiques might proceed
from a fear of bad incentives.
One is stasis. That is, governments fearing taint will fear to update
policies because a new policy may well be continuous with an old policy in form and effect (after all, some governmental problems are constant). This would hinder necessary updates in important areas. This
seems more of a feature than a bug. We should want to encourage
policy change only if such change will not perpetuate past taint.
Otherwise, change may work primarily to insulate the problematic
character of the old policy from challenge, which is exactly what the
taint concept should prevent. Far from dissuading new policy, taint
should encourage governments to work affirmatively to purge taint in
ways that ensure new policies are in fact new.
Another concern might be the futility fear that animated Palmer v.
Thompson.404 On this view, taint is a time-wasting paper tiger because
governments unable to validate their T2 policy will simply go back
and “do it better” at T3 and produce essentially the same program.
Again, I do not see this objection as uncovering a major demerit.
First, a government’s ability to justify essentially the same program
under a heightened standard keyed to the harms of the past is evidence
of legitimate purging.
Here, taint works similarly to a
Calabresian “constitutional remand.”405 One might say, for example,
that a law impugned by taint is “neither plainly unconstitutional . . . nor plainly constitutional,” at least in the sense that, in its form,
it is not per se invalid.406 Under those circumstances, taint forces the
government to demonstrate, in a substantial way, that legitimate contemporary grounds justify employing this tainted form.407
Second, sometimes the government simply will be unable to do it
“better,” perhaps because disparate impact persists without a plausibly
legitimate reason. So, imagine the city lost in Palmer. Assuming disparate impact,408 the government would need new, legitimate reasons
to demonstrate that a legitimate interest would be substantially
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
403 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 905–06 (1999); Stephanopoulos, supra note 261, at 1633–34.
404 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971).
405 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 738 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
406 Id.
407 Cf. id. (explaining that “constitutional remand” is for governmental “current and clearly expressed statements . . . of the state interests involved”).
408 See infra p. 1266.
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impaired absent a pool closure. This would not mean the city could
never close the pools,409 but it would require some substantial showing
of changed circumstances to show that pools previously thought worth
the cost now were not.410
Third, sometimes, the government will be unable to do it better because (whether due to unreconstructed animus or pandering to animus)
it is unwilling to treat the plausibly problematic past as a genuine concern, as taint requires. That might, for example, explain President
Trump’s inability to unequivocally disavow his past statements in
Trump.411
Fourth, taint focuses on severing links to the discriminatory past,
not eliminating all justice-based policy problems. If injustice persists,
as it often will, the solution must lie in some other legal doctrine (for
example, taint does not preclude a conventional equal protection challenge) or in the political process.
B. Future Lessons
Finally, some downstream implications of taint should be highlighted for potential future inquiry.
1. Leveling Down (and Palmer, Again). — Taint may shed some
light on the leveling-down problem. That is, an equal-treatment
violation can technically be remedied in two ways: providing the benefit to the aggrieved claimant (leveling up) or denying the benefit to all
instead of some (leveling down).412 Usually the aggrieved party wants
leveling up,413 and leveling down sometimes smacks of the monkey’s
paw.414
Taint can help articulate the intuition that something is wrong
here. (Re)consider Palmer, a classic leveling-down case.415 Recall that
Jackson closed its pools only after an injunction against their previous
segregation.416 Understanding T1 as the segregated status quo and T2
as the pool closure, a taint analysis permits us to articulate the
substantial similarity between the policies despite the facial difference
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
409
410

See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
The changed circumstances of private resistance to constitutional mandates would not be a
valid basis. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984); Randall Kennedy, Reconsidering
Palmer v. Thompson, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 203.
411 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2439 & n.4 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
412 See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 25, at 1122; HELLMAN, supra note 24, at 127; Pamela
S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2027
(1998).
413 See Karlan, supra note 412, at 2027.
414 That is, a wish granted perversely. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New
Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 715 & n.6 (2011) (citing W.W. JACOBS, The Monkey’s Paw, in THE
LADY OF THE BARGE AND OTHERS, ENTIRE COLLECTION 14 (The Echo Libr. 2009) (1902)).
415 Karlan, supra note 412, at 2027.
416 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971).

1266

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:1190

between open and closed pools. The same institutional actor took both
actions, and the litigation and injunction as intervening events help
cement the two policies’ nexus.
Any objection based on the formal equality of the pool closure (for
example, White people were unburdened before but are burdened
now) carries us to the second stage of the analysis. On disparate impact, the reality was that more White people had access to private pool
alternatives than Black people.417
It will often be thus:
“Disproportionate effects . . . are not difficult to discern in many leveling down cases, given the greater access of nonstigmatized groups to
substitute benefits.”418 Unable to utilize the impact escape hatch, the
city would be faced with the burden of showing substantial justification for closing pools that it was happy to operate until being instructed to operate them constitutionally.
In short, leveling down will generally generate clear continuity,
channeling the inquiry into considering whether any persistent realworld disparate impact can be justified. And, as is true generally, the
availability of a high-level legitimate reason (like cost) won’t suffice to
show that the burden of cost outweighs the harm of persistent disparate impact, especially if the cost is the cost of complying with the
Constitution. Because taint forces the state to make a real case that
leveling down was necessary, it helps pick out some of the more pernicious cases of leveling down (including those undertaken pretextually)
and helps explain why they are problematic: they work to lock in the
real-world harms of the original policy. This could be an underelaborated explanation of the constitutional problem with Virginia’s originally proposed remedy for its all-male military school in United States
v. Virginia419: a new all-female military school.420
2. Dissipation over Time and the Right-Remedy Relationship. —
This Article says little about cases where a wrongful act simply persists without modification or reenactment, on the theory that these are
easier cases generally and particularly with respect to the temporality
problem.421 Although this is probably a solid rule of thumb, harder

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
417 See, e.g., id. at 252 (White, J., dissenting) (observing that a formerly public pool was now
operated privately on a White-only basis).
418 Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling
Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 528 n.49 (2004). To be sure, one can dispute whether this counts as disparate impact, but my point is that at least one legitimate view of
the concept would detect it here.
419 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
420 See, e.g., id. at 526–28, 534, 548–49.
421 This is Hunter v. Underwood, which did get easy-case treatment. See supra note 64.
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variants exist, such as when the purpose and meaning of a formally
unchanged “longstanding . . . practice[]” supposedly evolves over time.422
Taint can help analyze such cases. For example, if change supposedly saves such an otherwise problematic policy, taint can support an
inquiry into whether the policy in this T2 context is sufficiently continuous with the T1 context. In a manner analogous to the heartland
taint case, we might profitably ask whether the policy continues to act
in a sufficiently similar way in the world and whether any intervening
events bear on how it should be understood today (such as, but not
limited to, changes in policy needs and relevant governing institutions).
If such continuity exists, taint might also prompt us to ask whether
disparate impact persists.423
Taint can also inform inquiries into the propriety of continuing injunctive relief for a T1 violation, such as school desegregation cases.424
If the question is whether the injunctive relief has “worked,” taint can
at least underscore that the mere passage of time is not enough to assume past evils have dissipated.425 Its utility here makes sense. Taint
asks questions in the T1/T2 context that resemble the important questions informing the termination of injunctive relief. Indeed, the definition of the present-day rights violation in a taint scenario includes the
existence of a past, not-fully-remedied rights violation. In this way,
taint is another example of the instability of the distinction often
drawn between “rights” and “remedies.”426
3. State Action. — In the Equal Protection Clause’s terms, this
Article deploys taint to reveal “den[ials]” of “equal protection” rather
than whether a “state” has acted.427 Still, the treatment of similarity
over time may also illuminate cases where nonstate actors appear to
have taken the state’s discriminating oar.
The White Primary Cases may be emblematic. Every case after
the first considered whether concededly exclusionary rules constituted
state action.428 In the hardest case (Terry), four Justices’ state-action
That conclusion was less
conclusion emphasized continuity.429
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
422 Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2083 (2019); see id. at 2082–84 (considering this possibility in the Establishment Clause context and noting the Statue of Liberty’s
changing meaning).
423 The analogy is imperfect, since it seems inappropriate to let the state “justify” a formally
unchanged T1 that in fact continues to operate in the same way, including disparate impact. At
that point, conventional constitutional analysis seems appropriate.
424 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 8, at 1163–64.
425 See Boddie, supra note 16, at 1294–96 (critiquing the Supreme Court’s assumption in desegregation cases “that the passage of time cures the constitutional violation,” id. at 1294).
426 See Levinson, supra note 403, at 884–85, 900. I thank David Pozen for prompting my appreciation of this implication.
427 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
428 See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 266–78.
429 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 480 & n.7 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring).
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obvious for the private Jaybird Party’s rules than for the original statute barring Black Texans’ participation.430 A taint-like consideration
of continuity in real-world effect might be an underelaborated basis for
Terry: every rule in fact excluded Black Texans from participating in
the only meaningful primary. Coupled with the multiple previous
Supreme Court interventions in that aspect of Texan governance, that
continuity perhaps revealed the initial state action’s persistent “taint.”
This reasoning would extend the thesis. Rather than treating institutional continuity as a prerequisite to taint, taint would play a role in
showing that continuity. I am more tentative on this necessarily lessconstraining framework’s desirability. But the potential extension is at
least plausible where a public-to-private shift appears to thwart constitutional scrutiny. Even sans institutional continuity, the framework
seems apt for determining whether the state “has become entangled
with a private entity” or “approved, encouraged, or facilitated private
conduct.”431
4. Other Wrongful Discrimination. — In taking equal-treatment
principles as the paradigm, this Article focuses primarily on the Equal
Protection Clause and Religion Clause cases that basically raise equaltreatment complaints.432 Putting aside the scholarly value of depth
over breadth, I think, in line with Professor Jack Balkin, that statusdiscrimination cases are uniquely pernicious.433 Even if that justifies
this Article’s scope, discrimination matters in other constitutional areas, such as content-discrimination free speech doctrine,434 Article IV,
and the inferred dormant commerce clause.435 Moreover, many federal
and state statutory provisions aim to address legislatively defined
wrongful discrimination.
Although taint might be transplanted to these areas, different considerations might apply. For example, the Court analyzes some
Religion Clause questions arguably involving discrimination in ways
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
430
431

See supra p. 1200.
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1536 (8th ed. 2017). Absent
institutional continuity, additionally, the framework might be informative for analysis of problematic “borrowing” between jurisdictions. Again, this is a tentative observation warranting future
analysis.
432 See supra p. 1198. For example, the Establishment Clause claim in Trump v. Hawaii was
that the policy “singl[ed] out Muslims for disfavored treatment.” 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018).
The only apparent reason this sort of claim is not an equal protection claim is that courts prefer
religion-specific constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648,
651 (1992) (recognizing, in dicta, religion as a suspect equal protection class); Caroline Mala
Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347, 379 (2012).
433 See Balkin, supra note 31, at 2368.
434 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 286–92
(2012).
435 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 369, at 1471–72.
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quite different from equal protection questions.436 Dormant commerce
clause discrimination’s concern with economic protectionism is not
necessarily coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause’s concerns.437
Something similar can be said about the Free Speech Clause’s core
concerns,438 which are themselves the subject of considerable
debate.439
In the statutory realm, despite much similarity between Title VII’s
race-discrimination prohibition and constitutional equal protection
constraints,440 Title VII’s “motivating factor” analysis permits liability
under circumstances that would not support constitutional liability.441
So too for section 2 of the VRA.442
My sense is that this Article’s view of policy continuity is largely
portable, but that how we treat such continuity may vary as substantive contexts change. For example, taint might fit best with statutes
that expressly reject the specific-intent view of discrimination (for example, Title VII and the VRA). More broadly, the core concerns animating the constitutional or statutory provision may warrant different
treatment of T1 policies within its sphere. Regardless, this Article’s
definition of taint permits its location in a way that does not lock us
into a single way of dealing with it across subject matters. That is a
final benefit of staging the analysis.
CONCLUSION
It is useful, but sometimes inadequate, to know that history
“matters.” When constitutional discrimination is at issue, cases of policy continuity over time show that truism’s limits. Here, at least, we
can and should say more about how that history matters. By letting us
identify problematic continuity in a regimented way, discriminatory
taint offers one novel way to do so.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
436 See, e.g, Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam) (holding strict scrutiny appropriate “whenever [government] treat[s] any comparable secular activity more favorably
than religious exercise,” which might create de facto disparate impact liability (first emphasis
added)); cf. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1896–97 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring) (asserting
that the Free Exercise Clause contains no equal-treatment principle); Caroline Mala Corbin,
Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 299, 304
(2015) (sketching the Establishment Clause’s unsettled doctrinal contours).
437 See, e.g., Huq, supra note 10, at 1219 n.32, 1220 n.33.
438 See Kendrick, supra note 434, at 296.
439 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 403, at 902–03.
440 See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431,
1454–55, 1454 n.97 (2012).
441 See, e.g., id. at 1454–55 (observing possible lack of symmetry in Title VII and constitutional
“intent” discourse); Verstein, supra note 258, at 1155–59.
442 See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2021).
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The concept does not answer every associated question. Indeed,
properly understood, knowing that a policy is tainted does not dictate
its validity. But taint offers reasoned guideposts that shape an important inquiry in ways consistent with broader commitments and
consonant with the need to eradicate discrimination and avoid unwarranted “lock in.” In so doing, it advances antidiscrimination principles
in a transsubstantive way and offers insight into what we mean — and
should mean — when we talk about wrongful discrimination.

